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REFRAMING THE (FALSE?) CHOICE BETWEEN 
PURCHASER WELFARE AND TOTAL WELFARE 
Alan J. Meese* 
 
This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off 
paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare” 
that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine.  
The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the 
debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total 
welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser 
welfare.”  In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new 
efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output 
and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets.  Moreover, the model 
also assumes that both the positive and negative impacts of a transaction 
are permanent and occur immediately and simultaneously.  As a result, the 
model excludes the (very real) possibility that subsequent entry will 
undermine or mitigate any market power, leaving only efficiencies that 
benefit purchasers in the original market. 
Removal of these unrealistic assumptions requires the antitrust 
community to reframe the debate about the appropriate welfare standard 
for antitrust and could require adjustment of the standards applied to 
practices that both raise prices and create efficiencies in the relevant 
market.  For instance, recognition that efficiencies generated in one market 
cause resource flows to other markets and higher output in such markets 
undermines claims that producers “pocket” efficiencies whenever a 
practice results in higher prices.  Thus, instead of involving a conflict 
between “producers” and “purchasers” in a single market, transactions 
that both raise prices and create efficiencies require antitrust policy to 
resolve a conflict between purchasers in the original market, on the one 
hand, and those in other markets, on the other.  In the same way, the 
realization that the trade-off model ignores the passage of time requires 
antitrust policy to resolve a conflict between current and future purchasers 
in the original market. 
 
*  Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School.  The author is grateful to Sarah 
Stafford for enlightening discussions about the project.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Rational implementation of the antitrust laws requires courts and the 
enforcement agencies to identify, articulate, and apply some organizing 
principle when developing doctrine that governs antitrust disputes.  For 
instance, application of the Sherman Act’s “Rule of Reason” requires courts 
and enforcers to ascertain the distinction between “reasonable” and 
“unreasonable” restraints.  Moreover, the Clayton Act’s ban on mergers or 
exclusive agreements that “substantially lessen competition” requires courts 
to articulate and enforce a preferred version of “competition.”  Finally, 
courts enforcing section 2 of the Sherman Act, which bans 
“monopolization” and not merely “monopoly,” must determine what sort of 
economic effect distinguishes old-fashioned rivalry from “unlawful 
exclusion” necessary to a finding of monopolization. 
Most scholars, judges, and enforcement officials have endorsed 
“consumer welfare” as this organizing principle.  Under a “consumer 
welfare” standard, courts would fashion antitrust doctrine governing 
restraints, mergers, or unilateral conduct so as to ban only those practices 
that reduce such welfare, while leaving those that do not unscathed.  Such 
an approach roughly tracks that announced in Standard Oil Co. of New 
Jersey v. United States,1 where the Court held that the sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act ban all agreements or unilateral practices that produce 
“monopoly or its consequences,” which the Court equated with increased 
prices, reduced quality, or reduced output.  All other practices, the Court 
said, were “normal” or “usual” practices that forwarded, increased, or 
fructified trade and thus did not violate the Sherman Act. 
At the same time, “consumer welfare” (or, for that matter, “the 
consequences of monopoly”) means different things to different people.  In 
particular, some equate “consumer welfare” with the welfare of all 
 
 1. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
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consumers in society, while others equate “consumer welfare” with the 
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market governed by the challenged 
restraint, merger, or unilateral practice.  The first definition of “consumer 
welfare” is really a “total welfare” standard, while the second definition is 
best described as a “purchaser welfare” standard.  That is, the first treats the 
only harmful consequence of monopoly as output reduction and resulting 
misallocation of resources and deadweight loss, while the second treats all 
reductions in purchaser welfare, including price increases, as harmful.  
Under the first definition, courts would only ban those restraints that reduce 
society’s overall welfare or, more technically, are “inefficient” in a Kaldor-
Hicks sense.  Under the second definition, by contrast, courts would ban 
any restraint that reduces the “consumer surplus” of purchasers in the 
relevant market, even if the restraint increases the welfare of producers by a 
greater amount. 
The choice between these two standards often will not matter for antitrust 
doctrine.  After all, most commercial conduct increases welfare according 
to either definition, or at least does not reduce it.  Moreover, some conduct 
reduces welfare under both definitions.  At the same time, there is a subset 
of conduct that a “purchaser welfare” standard would condemn, but that a 
“total welfare” approach would leave unscathed and even applaud. In 
particular, some conduct will both increase prices and also create 
efficiencies that outweigh any deadweight losses, thereby increasing overall 
welfare but reducing the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.  
Moreover, the choice between enforcement regimes, as well as the amount 
invested in enforcement, necessarily turns on the regime’s account of 
“antitrust harm,” which, in turn, depends upon one’s choice between 
competing definitions of “consumer welfare.” 
The choice between competing definitions of “consumer welfare” is 
ultimately a normative one; economic theory cannot make the choice for us.  
At the same time, such theory can inform or frame the debate in a way that 
might influence the normative outcome.  This Article argues that economic 
theory has done exactly that, namely, framed the choice between these two 
standards in a manner that creates a misleading or at least incomplete 
debate.  In particular, the Article examines the influence of Oliver 
Williamson’s partial equilibrium trade-off model, first developed to 
examine the welfare consequences of mergers and other practices that both 
increase prices and create efficiencies that reduce costs. 
Ironically, both consumer welfare schools invoke Williamson’s model 
when articulating their competing approaches.  Thus, the total welfare camp 
invokes the model to illustrate how practices that create market power and 
higher prices can nonetheless increase overall welfare by producing 
efficiencies that counteract the deadweight allocative losses resulting from 
enhanced market power.  Where the welfare impact of efficiencies exceeds 
that of deadweight losses, they contend, courts should validate the practice, 
even if it raises prices.  At the same time, the purchaser welfare school 
employs the partial equilibrium model to illustrate the concept of consumer 
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surplus, which this school of thought treats as the appropriate maximand for 
antitrust.  This school of thought also invokes this model to frame the 
normative choice as involving a trade-off between the welfare of producers, 
on the one hand, and consumers, on the other.  In so doing, both camps 
implicitly or explicitly invoke various assumptions of the trade-off model, 
including, for instance, the assumption that the studied transaction has no 
impact beyond the relevant market. 
This Article offers a critique of the role of the partial equilibrium 
paradigm in antitrust’s normative debate.  More precisely, the Article 
contends that common reliance on the partial equilibrium paradigm distorts 
the normative debate over appropriate welfare standards.  As shown, the 
partial equilibrium trade-off model excludes, by fiat, the impact of the 
transaction or practice under scrutiny upon other markets.  In particular, the 
model intentionally ignores the fact that realization of efficiencies frees up 
resources that necessarily flow to other markets, increasing output and thus 
increasing the welfare of purchasers in those markets.  Moreover, the model 
also assumes that both the positive and negative impacts of a transaction are 
permanent and occur immediately and simultaneously.  As a result, the 
model excludes the (very real) possibility that subsequent entry will 
undermine or mitigate any market power, leaving only efficiencies that 
benefit purchasers in the original market. 
Removal of these unrealistic assumptions requires the antitrust 
community to reframe the debate about the appropriate welfare standard for 
antitrust and could require adjustment of the standards applied to such 
restraints.  For instance, recognition that efficiencies generated in one 
market result in resource flows to other markets and higher output in such 
markets undermines any argument based on a claim that producers “pocket” 
efficiencies whenever an efficiency-creating transaction results in higher 
prices.  Thus, instead of involving a conflict between “producers” and 
“purchasers” in a single market, transactions that both raise prices and 
create efficiencies require antitrust law and policy to resolve a conflict 
between purchasers in the original market, on the one hand, and those in 
other markets, on the other.  In the same way, the realization that the partial 
equilibrium model ignores the passage of time requires antitrust law and 
policy to resolve a conflict between current purchasers in the original 
market and those individuals who might purchase in that market in the 
future.  This more nuanced and complete understanding of “what is at 
stake” where such transactions are concerned may help explain courts’ 
seemingly ambiguous attitude toward the choice between the two 
competing definitions of “consumer welfare.” 
Part I of this Article reviews the two competing definitions of “consumer 
welfare” articulated by the academic community and examines which 
version(s), if any, courts have adopted.  Part II explains how both the 
“purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” camps embrace the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model, along with its various restrictive assumptions, 
employing the model to frame their respective positions.  Part III outlines 
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the trade-off model.  Part IV examines the shortcomings of the model as 
applied to efficient conduct that also increases prices.  Part V explains how 
these shortcomings require the antitrust community to reframe the debate 
between the purchaser welfare and total welfare schools of thought.  This 
part also offers suggestions for changes in the standards governing efficient 
but price-raising conduct. 
I.  THE COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF CONSUMER WELFARE:  
TOTAL WELFARE OR PURCHASER WELFARE 
For more than three decades, most scholars, judges, and enforcement 
officials have endorsed “consumer welfare” as antitrust law’s organizing 
principle.2  Under this approach, courts would fashion antitrust doctrine so 
as to ban only those practices that reduce such welfare, leaving all other 
conduct unscathed and subject to market discipline and regulation by other 
bodies of law.3  Implementation of this goal roughly tracks the normative 
content of the Rule of Reason, announced in Standard Oil v. United States 
States.4  According to Standard Oil, the Sherman Act bans those 
agreements, and only those agreements, that restrain trade “unduly” by 
producing monopoly or “the consequences of monopoly.”5  Moreover, the 
decision defined such consequences as entailing higher prices, reduced 
quality, or reduced output.6 
At the same time, there is substantial disagreement about the meaning of 
“consumer welfare” and thus the relevance to antitrust analysis of various 
 
 2. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 81–89 (1978); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 
83–86 (4th ed. 2011); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 
9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (contending that Congress intended maximization of “consumer 
welfare” or “consumer want satisfaction” to serve as the principle guiding development of 
Sherman Act doctrine); Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary 
Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 
(1982); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 
133, 133–34 (2010) (“All antitrust lawyers and economists know that the stated instrumental 
goal of antitrust laws is ‘consumer welfare,’ which is a defined term in economics.”); Robert 
Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade 
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 217 (2005) (contending that the welfare of consumers 
should drive enforcement priorities); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on 
Consumers, and the Flawed Profit Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329–33 
(2006) (endorsing a so-called “consumer welfare effect standard” whereby courts determine 
whether a restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market); see also Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“[The debates in Congress] suggest that 
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (citing BORK, 
supra, at 66)); Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (Sherman 
Act only bans restraints that reduce “consumer welfare”). 
 3. See, e.g., BORK, supra note at 2, at 81–89, 107–15. 
 4. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 5. See id. at 55–57. 
 6. Id. at 52 (listing these three evils of monopoly, which led to condemnation at 
common law). 
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possible impacts of conduct subject to antitrust scrutiny.7  Not surprisingly, 
some scholars would (quite naturally) equate consumer welfare with the 
welfare of purchasers and potential purchasers in the particular market 
potentially impacted by the challenged restraint—a conception that 
emphasizes the distributional effects of challenged restraints.8  These 
scholars contend that courts should ban any practice that reduces the 
welfare of such purchasers, even if the practice results in a more efficient 
allocation of resources and thus increases the total welfare of society.  Put 
more technically, these scholars would equate “consumer welfare” with the 
“consumer surplus” generated in the particular market governed by a 
restraint, thereby ignoring the welfare of that same market’s producers.9  
 
 7. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 83–86; (discussing two different conceptions of 
“consumer welfare” potentially relevant to antitrust analysis); Orbach, supra note 2, at 137–
38 (“[T]oday, there are two major groups of thoughts [about how to define consumer 
welfare]:  one argues that the term should mean ‘consumer surplus,’ and the other asserts 
that the appropriate meaning is ‘total surplus’ or ‘aggregate welfare.’”). 
 8. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, Consumer 
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1987); Aaron S. Edlin, 
Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 144 
(Edward Elgar ed., 4th ed. 2012) (embracing such a purchaser-centric definition of 
“consumer welfare”); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of 
Antitrust:  Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191 
(2008) (same); Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 217 (endorsing a comparison of efficiency effects 
with adverse impacts on consumers in the market served by the monopolist); Salop, supra 
note 2, at 329–33 (endorsing the so-called “consumer welfare effect standard,” whereby 
courts determine whether a restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market); 
see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86 (apparently endorsing this definition of 
consumer welfare). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 147, 148 (2005) (advocating a test whereby the court weighs the harm to purchasers 
against the benefits of the challenged practice and bans the practice when harms are 
disproportionate to the benefits).  One scholar has suggested a compromise of sorts between 
these two approaches. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy As a Political 
Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2006) (contending that antitrust law should ban all 
practices that injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice very 
large efficiencies in a particular case). 
 9. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85 n.17 (explaining how this version of “consumer 
welfare” focuses on the maximization of consumer surplus in a particular market and thus 
ignores the impact of a practice on the welfare of producers); Brodley, supra note 8, at 1033 
(“However, if consumer welfare is to serve as an operational principle of antitrust law, it 
must refer to the direct and explicit economic benefits received by the consumers of a 
particular product as measured by its price and quality.  Using the more precise language of 
economics, consumer welfare can be defined as consumer surplus, which is that part of the 
total surplus that accrues to consumers.”).  As Barak Orbach has explained, a “consumer 
surplus” approach to antitrust depends upon the identification of a relevant market and 
subsequent assessment of the welfare of consumers in that market. See Orbach, supra note 2, 
at 138–39.  Presumably the “relevant market” for this purpose consists of the market treated 
as “relevant” for purposes of the appropriate antitrust analysis of the challenged restraint 
(e.g., the “market” that a defendant has allegedly monopolized in violation of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act or the market where a merger allegedly substantially lessens competition). See 
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (forbidding monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy 
to monopolize “any part of the trade or commerce among the several States”); id. § 18 
(forbidding mergers that tend substantially to lessen competition or create a monopoly in any 
“line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country”).  Of 
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For these scholars, antitrust law should ban all practices that reduce 
consumer surplus and should thus be agnostic about the efficient allocation 
of resources.  In fact, such an approach is downright hostile to such 
efficiency if the realization of efficiency requires reduction of consumer 
surplus.10 
At the same time, some other advocates expressly employ the term to 
refer to the welfare of all individuals in society, without regard to whether 
an individual actually “consumes” the product whose price, output, or 
quality the challenged practice affects.11  Indeed, members of this camp go 
so far as to include as “consumers” the shareholders of firms that have 
adopted a challenged practice or transaction.  Supporters of this approach 
note that “shareholders are people too” and that there is no reason to ignore 
their welfare when evaluating a restraint or crafting antitrust doctrine, even 
if any increase in their welfare includes supracompetitive profits that result 
 
course, in some instances, no overt market definition is necessary; the prime example is 
horizontal price fixing, where the law assumes that the agreement itself defines the extent of 
the market. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) 
(“‘Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter 
into conspiracies to fix prices.  Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.’” (quoting 
BORK, supra note 2, at 269)).  It is less clear how one would determine the relevant universe 
of consumers if courts accept recent proposals to dispense with market definition in certain 
merger cases.  In some cases, however, the choice of such a relevant market will necessarily 
be arbitrary.  Consider, for instance, a merger between two firms that produce automobiles 
for a national market.  Assume further that the merger produces significant efficiencies that 
manifest themselves as lower unit costs of producing the new firm’s product.  Finally, 
assume that the new firm cannot exercise market power in the national market but can, via 
price discrimination, exercise such power in a narrow submarket. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
& FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES].  The transaction will reduce prices in one market (the overall national 
market), while increasing prices in the price discrimination market(s) (unless the efficiencies 
are extremely large).  Thus, allowing the transaction will injure consumers in one (narrow) 
market, while banning the transaction will injure consumes in the larger market.  As far as 
the author is aware, proponents of the “purchaser welfare” version of “consumer welfare” 
have not offered a principle that would reveal which consumers the law should prefer in 
these circumstances. 
 10. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency As the Ruler of 
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988) (contending that purchaser welfare, and not 
efficiency (total welfare), is the appropriate organizing principle of antitrust law). 
 11. BORK, supra note 2, at 107–12 (equating “consumer welfare” with the welfare of all 
individuals in society, whether or not they are actual or potential purchasers in the market 
affected by the challenged restraint); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence, 
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702–03 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 
Workable Antitrust Policy] (“Members of Congress did not see themselves choosing 
between ‘efficiency’ and some other goal. . . .  However you slice the legislative history, the 
dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges.  This turns out to be the 
same program as one based on ‘efficiency.’”); Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile 
To Use Courts To Search for Exclusionary Conduct, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347 (2003) 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Exclusionary Conduct] (stating that concern for “consumers’ 
welfare” is a “shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of monopoly” and endorsing this 
approach).  The assumption, of course, is that every individual is also a consumer, thereby 
justifying the equation of the welfare of individuals with the welfare of “consumers.” 
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from an exercise of market power to the detriment of purchasers in the 
relevant market.12 
As others have explained, this version of “consumer welfare” really just 
seeks to maximize society’s total or aggregate welfare.13  This total welfare 
approach implies that courts should ignore any purely distributional effects 
of a challenged practice, given that pure redistribution is a zero-sum game 
with no net impact on society’s economic welfare, and instead only ban 
those practices that reduce the total value of society’s output by inducing a 
less efficient allocation of resources than existed before the restraint.14  Put 
more technically, this school of thought would have courts apply the 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion to challenged practices, thereby banning 
those practices—and only those practices—that result in a less efficient 
allocation of the society’s given resources, and thus reduce society’s overall 
stock of wealth, without regard to the distribution of such wealth.15 
Many attribute this equation of “consumer welfare” with “total welfare” 
to Robert Bork, who defined consumer welfare in this way during the 
1960s.16  However, Bork was not the first to define consumer welfare in 
this manner.  Instead, more than a decade before Bork’s major work on the 
subject, Arnold Harberger, an economist at the University of Chicago, 
employed the term in this manner in his seminal work.17  In particular, 
 
 12. See BORK, supra note 2, at 110 (treating owners of a monopoly as consumers whose 
welfare is part of the overall consumer welfare calculus); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 
2, at 85 (“[T]he consumer welfare principle [articulated by Bork and others] is predicated on 
the observation that everyone is a consumer.” (emphasis in the original)). 
 13. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86; Orbach, supra note 2, at 144; see also 
Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly:  The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
242, 245 (1967) (apparently equating “consumer welfare” with “national wealth”); Bork, 
supra note 2, at 7 (courts should interpret the Sherman Act so as to maximize “consumer 
welfare” or the “wealth or consumer want satisfaction”). 
 14. See BORK, supra note 2, at 110–12 (contending that courts should ignore 
considerations of income distribution between consumers and producers when fashioning 
antitrust doctrine); HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86 (describing this total welfare 
conception of “consumer welfare”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2d ed. 2001) 
(stating that promotion of “[allocative] efficiency” is the only proper objective of the 
antitrust laws); Easterbrook, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 347 (stating that 
concern for “consumers’ welfare” is “shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of 
monopoly”). 
 15. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 84 (equating this account of “consumer welfare” 
with a “potential Pareto” optimality standard, which is a Kaldor-Hicks standard); see also 
POSNER, supra note 14, at 2 (equating the “efficiency” relevant to antitrust laws with Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability 
Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69–71 (1968) (arguing that antitrust regulation can 
be explained as an effort to replicate allocation of resources that would occur in absence of 
bargaining costs, thereby maximizing total welfare); Alan J. Meese, Debunking The 
Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act:  How Harvard Brought Us a 
Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 701–02 
(2010).  It should be noted that Calabresi did not necessarily embrace this explanation as the 
sole possible rationale for antitrust regulation. See Calabresi, supra, at 69–71. 
 16. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 83–84. 
 17. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 
77 (1954). 
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Harberger set out to determine the overall impact of monopoly (both 
unilateral and shared) on resource allocation and resulting total economic 
welfare.  The resulting 1954 article employed the term “consumer welfare” 
seven times, each time in a manner that clearly equates the term with total 
welfare.18  While Bork never cited this or any other work by Harberger, he 
employed the same definition of “consumer welfare.” 
Several other proponents have endorsed such a “total welfare” standard 
in the antitrust context without attempting to equate such welfare with 
“consumer welfare.”19  Under such a “total welfare” approach, proof that a 
challenged practice exercises market power, distorts the allocation of 
resources, and injures consumers in a relevant market is only a necessary 
 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 84 (“Elimination of resource misallocations in American 
manufacturing in the late twenties would bring with it an improvement in consumer welfare 
of just a little more than a tenth of a per cent.  In present values, this welfare gain would 
amount to about $2.00 per capita.”); id. (characterizing this same loss as a “total welfare 
loss”); id. at 78 fig.1 (displaying the so-called “welfare loss triangle”); id. (stating that 
column 4 “measures the amount by which consumer ‘welfare’ fell short of the level it would 
have attained if resources had been so allocated as to give each industry an equal return on 
capital.  It assumes that the elasticity of demand for the products of each industry is unity 
and approximates the area designated as the ‘welfare loss’ in Figure 1.”). 
 19. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY:  AN ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959) (contending that antitrust law should adopt a “Pigouvian” approach 
that bans all practices that enhance market power without producing significant efficiencies); 
POSNER, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that promotion of “[allocative] efficiency” is the only 
proper objective of the antitrust laws); J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable 
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger 
Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29 (2006) (describing the 
difference between a “total welfare” and a so-called “consumer welfare” test as applied to 
mergers and advocating the adoption of the former); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law 
and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1938); Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other 
Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1969) (assuming the 
appropriate goal of economic policy is to “maximize aggregate economic wealth” and 
endorsing the view that economies of scale should justify high concentration); Oliver E. 
Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 105, 108–
09 (1969) (advocating the “allocative efficiency” approach on the grounds that such an 
approach will maximize society’s total welfare); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (antitrust should seek to maximize 
social welfare); Meese, supra note 15, at 668–69 (describing the contending definitions of 
“consumer welfare” and contending that Bork’s version is properly dubbed a “total welfare” 
standard); id. at 690–715 (contending that section 2 case law exemplifies a “total welfare” 
approach and that courts should retain such a standard).  Several other scholars have, over 
the years, embraced a “total welfare” approach when tackling antitrust problems, without 
recognizing the existence of an alternative standard.  It should be noted here that those who 
equate allocative improvements with improvements in total welfare necessarily assume that 
the marginal value of an additional dollar of wealth is equal across all members of society, or 
at least all those impacted by challenged conduct. See Williamson, supra, at 108 
(“Necessarily, for every allocative efficiency judgment which has distributional 
consequences, there exists an implicit, if not an explicit, distributional weighting.  Typically 
the benefits and costs are weighted equally, ‘to whomsoever they may accrue.’”); see also 
POSNER, supra note 14, at 23 (stating that the equation of allocative efficiency with total 
welfare rests upon the heroic “assumption that a dollar is worth the same to [everybody],” an 
assumption that allows for the equation of wealth maximization via allocative efficiency 
with utility and this welfare maximization). 
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attribute of antitrust harm, given that some practices that result in such 
misallocation and injury to market consumers might also create productive 
efficiencies.  The creation of such efficiencies is itself an improvement in 
the allocation of resources—an improvement that might exceed the 
allocative harm resulting from an exercise of market power.20  Given this 
possibility, the total welfare standard will only condemn those practices that 
reduce overall efficiency, that is, result in an allocation of resources that, on 
net, diverts resources to lowered-valued uses and thus reduces wealth and 
economic welfare.21  Consequently, unlike a purchaser welfare approach, 
the total welfare version of consumer welfare takes into account the well-
being of all members of society, including producers in the relevant market. 
The choice between these two definitions of “consumer welfare” is not 
always dispositive when analyzing challenged restraints.  After all, much 
conduct potentially subject to antitrust regulation—even conduct that 
eliminates rivalry between competitors—has no apparent impact on 
consumer welfare, however defined, or may even improve such welfare 
under either definition.  For instance, when two former rivals form a 
partnership, they reduce competition between themselves.  However, unless 
the reduction in rivalry confers market power on the parties, the reduction 
can neither raise prices nor cause a misallocation of resources and thus 
cannot reduce “consumer welfare” under either definition.22  In the same 
way, a merger or joint venture between two independent firms will certainly 
reduce rivalry but may not confer market power.  Indeed, like the formation 
of a partnership, a merger or joint venture may result in productive 
efficiencies and thus enhance the allocation of resources, increase market 
output, and reduce prices, thereby increasing consumer welfare under either 
definition.23 
 
 20. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 110–12.  It should be noted that Williamson 
obscured this point by his choice of terminology. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As 
an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare Tradeoffs, 59 AMER. ECON. REV. 18, 22 n.4 (1968) (“My 
use of dead-weight loss is somewhat restrictive.  Inefficiency is also a dead-weight loss.  For 
convenience of exposition, however, I refer to the Marshallian triangle as the dead-weight 
loss and compare this to the cost saving (efficiency) aspects of a merger.”).  In other 
contexts, economists regularly treat productive inefficiency as a misallocation of resources 
producing a deadweight loss. See infra notes 153–54, 218–21 and accompanying text. 
 21. See BORK, supra note 2, at 107–10; Williamson, supra note 19, at 107 (“The 
allocative efficiency consequences of any merger that increases both efficiency and market 
power can be evaluated only by estimating net effects.”); see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 
9 (articulating the view that “the economic theory of monopoly provides the only sound 
basis for antitrust policy”); id. at 27 (concluding that the “[total welfare] approach emerges 
as the natural, the feasible, and the legitimate guide to interpreting the antitrust statutes”). 
 22. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:  Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. 
Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“When two partners set the price of their goods or services, they 
are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.”). 
 23. See generally, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 
1898) (explaining how the common law encouraged the formation of partnerships and 
accompanying agreements even though the result was reduced competition between the 
partners); see also Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23 (“Mergers among competitors 
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On the other hand, some conduct reduces consumer welfare under either 
definition.  Naked horizontal price fixing, for instance, can exercise market 
power, increase consumer prices, and distort the allocation of resources, 
thereby reducing both total welfare and consumer surplus and thus the 
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.24  Not surprisingly, then, 
proponents of both schools of thought condemn such conduct.25  In the 
same way, a merger can enhance market concentration and thereby 
facilitate the unilateral or concerted exercise of market power, reducing the 
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market and distorting the allocation of 
resources.  Here again, and not surprisingly, both schools of thought 
condemn such transactions.26  Finally, conduct can exclude rivals on a basis 
other than efficiency and raise prices and distort the allocation of resources, 
here again reducing both total and purchaser welfare and eliciting the 
condemnation of both camps.27 
Not all conduct potentially subject to antitrust regulation is as 
unambiguously harmful or beneficial as the categories of conduct described 
above.  Instead, some conduct enhances producers’ market power while 
 
eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal, and many 
of them withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard.”); BORK, supra note 2, at 221 
(contending that the vast majority of mergers should be lawful because they lead to no 
market power and thus no allocative loss). 
 24. See BORK, supra note 2, at 263 (stating that the per se ban on price fixing has 
resulted in “contributions to consumer welfare over the decades [that] have been 
enormous”).  To be sure, price fixing by small market participants my produce no harm 
whatsoever, at least in theory.  However, as the Supreme Court has explained, the fact that 
cartel participants expend resources creating, enforcing, and defending a price fixing 
agreement thereby signals members’ belief that they constitute a ‘relevant market” for 
antitrust purposes and thus have the power to exercise market power and impose harm. See 
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) (“‘Very few firms 
that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies 
to fix prices.  Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.’” (quoting BORK, supra note 2, 
at 269)). 
 25. See BORK, supra note 2, at 267–69 (contending that cartel pricing should be unlawful 
per se); Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion:  Fixing Prices, 
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941, 944–46 (same). 
 26. See generally BORK, supra note 2, at 220–22 (condemning mergers that lead to high 
enough market concentration to confer market power and thus produce allocative losses); 
Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983); Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–09 (advocating so-called 
“allocative efficiency criterion” that would ban any transaction that results in a net allocative 
loss, including mergers that raise prices without producing efficiencies).  Of course, Bork 
opined that courts should not engage in a case-by-case comparison of the allocative losses 
resulting from market power with the allocative gains resulting from productive efficiencies. 
See BORK, supra note 2, at 122–29.  He did so because he believed that such balancing was 
beyond the capacity of the courts and not because he believed that such efficiencies were 
irrelevant as a normative matter. 
 27. See BORK, supra note 2, at 160 (approving a ban on “improper exclusion,” that is, 
conduct that excludes rivals on some basis other than efficiency and thus protects monopoly 
without offsetting benefits); Salop, supra note 2, at 317 (approving a ban on conduct that 
excludes rivals without producing any benefits). 
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simultaneously creating significant productive efficiencies.28  Where such 
“mixed” or “ambiguous” conduct is concerned, the choice between “total 
welfare” and “purchaser welfare” standards and their respective accounts of 
antitrust harm will usually (but not always) be dispositive.  Thus, the choice 
between a “purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” definition of “consumer 
welfare” can have significant consequences for antitrust doctrine.29   
Take merger law.  While most mergers are either unambiguously 
harmful, beneficial, or benign, some are a “mixed bag,” enhancing market 
power and creating productive efficiencies.30  Under a “purchaser welfare 
approach,” a merger that both enhances the market power of the newly 
created firm while simultaneously creating efficiencies is invalid, except in 
those rare cases in which the transaction creates efficiencies so large that 
they compel the new firm to “pass on” such efficiencies to purchasers in the 
relevant market, by charging prices lower than or equal to those charged 
before the transaction and thereby protecting purchasers in the relevant 
market from overcharges.31  Thus, it is said, courts and agencies should 
ignore those efficiencies that only manifest themselves as profits for 
shareholders of the merging parties and thus increase producer surplus even 
if those efficiencies produce allocative gains that outweigh the harm 
resulting from the market-power induced misallocation of resources and 
result in an increase in total welfare.32   
By contrast, under a total welfare approach, price is beside the point 
when analyzing such a transaction; a merger that creates market power and 
results in higher prices will nonetheless survive scrutiny whenever it creates 
productive, and thus allocative, efficiencies that outweigh the relatively 
small deadweight loss resulting from the misallocation of resources 
associated with market power.33  Such a transaction should survive 
scrutiny, it is said, even if the shareholders of the merging firms capture all 
 
 28. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–07 (describing so-called “mixed cases” 
whereby challenged conduct both enhances market power and results in productive 
efficiency—both impacts which have offsetting allocative consequences). 
 29. But see Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 1703 (“There are 
differences at the margins [between a policy based on ‘purchaser welfare’ and one based on 
‘total welfare’] such as what if anything to do about price discrimination . . . but the 
differences are not very important.”). 
 30. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–07. 
 31. Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1589 (contending that section 7 of the Clayton Act 
forbids any merger that results in higher prices, without regard to the overall impact upon 
total welfare); id. at 1592 (“In short, Congress’ primary concern was to prevent the 
formation of market power that would unfairly transfer wealth from consumers to 
monopolists; efficiency was only of small concern.  Congress’ goal was competitive pricing, 
which it defined primarily in distributive rather than in efficiency terms.”). 
 32. See id. at 1632–33 (contending that the courts should treat “wealth transfer effects” 
and the resulting increase in producer surplus as consumer harm when evaluating a merger 
that creates both efficiencies and market power). 
 33. See BORK, supra note 2, at 107–10 (employing this example to illustrate implications 
of the total welfare approach); Williamson, supra note 19, at 108 (“The emphasis throughout 
is on mergers, but much of the argument generalizes easily.”). 
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of the welfare gains attributable to the transaction, because it results in a net 
improvement in the allocation of society’s resources and thus improves 
society’s total economic welfare.34  Indeed, more than four decades ago, 
Oliver Williamson, applying a “naïve” partial equilibrium trade-off model, 
demonstrated that a reduction in production costs of 2 percent would almost 
always produce efficiencies that offset the reduction in welfare resulting 
from a misallocation of resources caused by enhanced market power.35 
The choice between competing welfare standards can have similar 
consequences in other contexts where transactions simultaneously produce 
market power and productive efficiencies and thus have offsetting 
allocative effects.  For instance, section 1’s Rule of Reason requires courts 
to “weigh” or “balance” a restraint’s harms against any benefits it produces 
to determine the restraint’s overall impact on consumer welfare.36  The 
exact nature of such balancing will, not surprisingly, depend upon the 
tribunal’s choice between a “purchaser welfare” and a “total welfare” 
standard.37  Under a purchaser welfare standard, courts will focus on the 
impact of the challenged restraint on price in the relevant market, asking 
whether the benefits of the restraint offset the negative impact on 
consumers resulting from any exercise of market power.38  Under a total 
welfare standard, by contrast, courts will balance the quantum of 
efficiencies produced by the restraint against the harm resulting from the 
misallocation of resources caused by any market power.39  As a result, and 
as with mergers, application of a total welfare standard will leave unscathed 
numerous restraints that a purchaser welfare standard would condemn.40  
Moreover, courts applying section 2’s ban on “monopolization” must 
evaluate conduct that either led to or preserved a monopoly and, thus, 
perhaps resulted in prices higher than would have occurred without such 
 
 34. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–09. 
 35. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23. 
 36. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 77, 98–99.  For a classic statement, see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th 
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge 
whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable.” (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA, 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1502 (1986))). 
 37. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of 
Antitrust:  An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012). 
 38. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1985) (condemning 
a challenged restraint despite the claim that it produced efficiencies given the trial court’s 
findings that the restraint resulted in higher prices and reduced output in the relevant 
market). 
 39. See generally Blair & Sokol, supra note 37; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1984) (resting an argument for relatively 
permissive antitrust rules on the unelaborated assumption that the misallocation of resources 
is the only harm from monopoly pricing and that false positives deter cost-reducing conduct 
and increase the cost of producing the market’s entire output). 
 40. But see Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason:  An Empirical Update for the 21st 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009) (finding that over 95 percent of Rule of 
Reason cases fail for lack of proof of harm under either standard). 
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conduct.41  Some such conduct simply excludes rivals and creates or 
preserves monopoly without producing any offsetting virtues and is thus 
subject to condemnation under any standard.42  Other conduct, however, 
both excludes rivals and produces nontrivial benefits.  The classic example, 
akin to the efficiency-creating merger, entails the expansion of output and 
realization of efficiencies, a form of “competition on the merits” that allows 
a putative monopolist to underprice smaller firms, thereby driving rivals 
from the market and deterring entry by others.43  After taking over the 
market, the firm could raise prices above the preexisting level, while 
continuing to realize efficiencies whose positive impact outweighs any 
allocative losses.44  Here again, the choice between competing definitions 
of “consumer welfare” will determine whether courts and agencies 
condemn such conduct.45 
Finally, separate and apart from any impact on substantive doctrine, the 
choice between these two definitions of consumer welfare will have 
important implications for public and private enforcement, particularly 
when viewed through the lens of the optimal deterrence model.46  This 
model posits an inverse relationship between investments in various forms 
of law enforcement (e.g., detection, prosecution, and sanctions), on the one 
hand, and the activity producing social harm (e.g., cartels), on the other.  
Such “investments,” of course, include the cost of so-called “false 
positives,” that is, the (forgone) benefits of conduct that an imperfect 
 
 41. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480–81 
(1992) (noting that a successful monopolization claim requires proof that monopolist used 
monopoly power to acquire or maintain the monopoly); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 
U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (same). 
 42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482–83 (explaining how maintenance of monopoly 
by means of efficiency is lawful per se); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. 
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (competition “based on pure 
merit,” including realization of efficiencies, is unlawful per se); see also Meese, supra note 
15, at 690–715 (explaining how “competition on the merits” has been lawful per se since the 
1950s). 
 44. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 29–31 (describing a natural monopoly achieved 
because of economies of scale); see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, 
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 151–52 (2d ed. 1994) (same); id. at 139–41 (discussing 
other possible efficiency sources of monopoly). 
 45. Compare Meese, supra note 15, at 671–72 (explaining how the application of a total 
welfare standard will validate such conduct, without regard to the resulting price), with 
Edlin, supra note 8 (contending that courts should adopt rules governing predatory pricing 
that encourage entry of inefficient rivals when necessary to reduce purchaser prices). See 
also CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY:  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF AN ANTITRUST CASE 16–19 (1956) (arguing that monopoly maintained by means of 
economies of scale is unobjectionable); KAYNES & TURNER, supra note 19, at 22, 268; Oliver 
E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem:  Market Failure 
Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1972). 
 46. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:  An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983) (applying Becker’s model in the antitrust context). 
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enforcement regime will ban.47  The model also posits that investments in 
enforcement are characterized by diminishing returns.  Thus, while each 
incremental dollar spent on law enforcement will further reduce the targeted 
social harm, such reductions may at some point be so small that additional 
investments in law enforcement will reduce overall welfare.  If this is the 
case, then a wealth-maximizing society will tolerate a certain amount of 
harm-creating conduct.48  As a result, the optimal deterrence model implies 
that society should invest resources in law enforcement until the last dollar 
invested reduces the targeted harm by the same amount.  Such a strategy 
will thus minimize the overall social cost of the activity in question, defined 
as the sum of enforcement costs plus the cost of any remaining social 
harm.49  If so, then wealth maximization requires that mix and level of 
investments that minimize the sum of such investments and resulting social 
harm. 
Of course, application of this model requires courts and agencies to 
identify the relevant “social harm” that investments in law enforcement are 
supposed to reduce.  Obviously, different definitions of “consumer welfare” 
imply different definitions of “social harm” relevant to this calculus.  Under 
the “total welfare” view, the only relevant harm is any net reduction in total 
welfare resulting from an overall inefficient allocation of resources.50  
Under this view, even a naked cartel might produce relatively modest actual 
harm.51  Under the “purchaser welfare” view, by contrast, any reduction in 
consumer surplus in the relevant market constitutes harm, even if the 
transaction actually increases total welfare.52  As a result, the “payoffs” 
from particular investments in enforcement of the antitrust laws will vary 
significantly between the two regimes, even with respect to those restraints, 
like naked cartels, that both schools of thought would condemn, as will the 
optimal structure of enforcement institutions and penalties.53  Roughly 
 
 47. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 
305, 307–09 (1987). 
 48. See Landes, supra note 46, at 652–53 (“[Becker] showed that when the costs of 
enforcement are positive, it is generally not optimal to reduce the number of violations to 
zero.”). 
 49. See id.  
 50. See id. at 653 (adopting the total welfare standard when applying an optimal 
deterrence model to determine antitrust sanctions); Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 15–16 
(treating the misallocation of resources as the only pertinent harm when deriving optimal 
antitrust rules). 
 51. Cf. Harberger, supra note 17, at 84 (finding that the total reduction in GNP resulting 
from monopolistic misallocations amounted to about $2.00 per consumer). 
 52. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 53. Of course, any assessment of the relevant “costs” of enforcement would have to 
include the costs of “false positives,” that is, instances in which courts condemn a restraint, 
transaction, or practice that in fact produces benefits.  As I have explained elsewhere, what 
counts as a “false positive” will depend significantly upon the definition of “harm” that 
courts posit. See Meese, supra note 15, at 661–62.  Thus, to the extent that different 
institutional arrangements—private enforcement in Article III courts, public enforcement in 
Article III Courts, and/or administrative enforcement before the Federal Trade 
Commission—result in different sorts of errors, the choice between two definitions of 
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speaking, it seems clear that a “purchaser welfare” conception of antitrust 
harm will warrant more robust investments in enforcing the various 
antitrust laws than a total welfare approach.54  For one thing, the latter 
approach would leave completely unscathed some practices that the 
purchaser welfare standard would condemn.  Moreover, while both 
standards would condemn a naked cartel, for instance, the purchaser welfare 
standard would attribute far more harm to such price fixing than a total 
welfare approach.55  As a result, investments in law enforcement that might 
pay off handsomely under a purchaser welfare standard may actually reduce 
welfare under a total welfare standard. 
It bears repeating that a preference for a purchaser welfare standard over 
a total welfare standard will destroy wealth as economists and others 
conventionally define it.56  Indeed, in some cases, application of the 
purchaser welfare standard will eliminate wealth that exceeds preserved 
consumer surplus several times over.  Assume, for instance, that a merger to 
monopoly produces both market power and large efficiencies.  Assume 
further that the efficiencies are so large, perhaps a 25 percent cost reduction, 
that they would almost (but not quite) prevent the new firm from pricing 
above the premerger level (e.g., that a postmerger price increase would not 
exceed 5 percent).57  While banning such a transaction would preserve the 
value of premerger consumer surplus, by preventing a modest price 
increase, it would do so only by preventing the realization of efficiencies 
 
consumer welfare may influence the appropriate mix and jurisdiction of institutions chosen 
to enforce the antitrust laws. 
 54. Indeed, application of the optimal deterrence model may suggest that the “purchaser 
welfare standard” proves too much and thus cannot be applied consistently and to its logical 
conclusion.  After all, given its hostility toward efficiency “as such,” the purchaser welfare 
standard would require any additional investment (e.g., large public expenditures, many false 
positives, and reduced efficiencies), so long as the incremental investment would slightly 
improve purchaser welfare. But cf. Baker, supra note 8 (contending that antitrust law should 
ban all practices that injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice 
very large efficiencies in a particular case). 
 55. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 20, at 21 (graphically demonstrating both 
deadweight efficiency loss and significantly larger transfer of income from purchasers to 
producers resulting from merger-created market power). 
 56. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1631 (noting that most economists employ a 
“total welfare” metric for measuring the impact of transactions that create both market power 
and efficiencies). See also generally Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1985). 
 57. See Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword:  Could a 
Merger Lead to Both Monopoly and a Lower Price, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983) (finding 
that merger to monopoly will often lead to higher prices despite large efficiencies); id. at 
1702 (“A merger would have to produce extraordinarily large cost savings to permit the 
same or lower prices from monopoly than from a premerger competitive situation.”); id. 
(concluding that, where the elasticity of demand in the premerger market was four, cost 
reduction of 25 percent would be necessary to counteract the resulting exercise of monopoly 
power, while an even larger cost reduction would be necessary if elasticity were smaller); 
see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 22 (3d ed. 1990) (illustrating how a very efficient monopoly could charge 
profit-maximizing prices below what would prevail in a competitive market). 
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that exceed this preserved surplus by almost a factor of five.58  Such 
considerations may explain why some scholars, otherwise sympathetic to 
the purchaser welfare approach, contend that courts should recognize an 
exception for those instances in which a challenged practice or transaction 
produces efficiencies that greatly outweigh the reduction in consumer 
surplus.59  They may also explain why some contend that a total welfare 
approach will actually enhance the welfare of purchasers in the long run.60 
The choice between “total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” as the 
governing standard is a normative one, and there are various possible ways 
to answer this normative question.  The chief proponents of the “purchaser 
welfare” and “total welfare” schools of thought have taken a legal approach 
to discerning the appropriate normative standard in this context, with each 
claiming that its preferred approach is consistent with the original meaning 
of the Sherman Act.61  Both also derive that meaning by means of the now 
out-of-fashion method of scrutinizing the legislative history of the Act to 
determine its authors’ “original intent,” which, each camp claims, supports 
its preferred interpretation.62  In particular, the “total welfare” camp 
 
 58. “Almost” a factor of five because banning the transaction would also protect those 
marginal consumers who would suffer a loss in surplus as a result of the output reduction 
that would have resulted from the merger. See generally Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–
23. 
 59. See Baker, supra note 8 (contending that antitrust law should ban all practices that 
injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice very large 
efficiencies in a particular case). 
 60. See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 1703 (“In the long run consumers gain the most 
from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive efficiency.”). See also HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 2, at 86 (“most efficiencies have a way of trickling through the economy so that 
they benefit everyone.”). 
 61. Some take a different approach.  For instance, eschewing conventional legal 
analysis, Professor Baker has sought to determine which approach would obtain and enjoy 
stable political support by consumers and producers. See Baker, supra note 8.  Moreover, 
Richard Posner concedes that the legislative history contains many references to the “non-
economic” approach (in which he includes the distributional, purchaser welfare approach as 
well as concerns for small business and the like). See POSNER, supra note 14, at 26–27.  
However, he also contends that the statutory language invites (but does not compel), a total 
welfare approach and that any other approach would be unworkable. See id.  Indeed, Bork 
himself contended that departure from a “total welfare” approach would require courts to 
make value choices and trade-offs that are beyond the legitimate authority of courts, absent 
an express delegation from Congress. See Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly:  The 
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1967).  While both men may be correct 
that an antitrust policy based upon a concern for the autonomy of small business as one or 
several values is unworkable, neither explains why a policy based upon “purchaser welfare,” 
a single, clear objective, would be unworkable.  Judge Bork’s failure to address this 
objection is understandable, however, insofar as his writings on the topic predated Professor 
Lande’s contention, based on a detailed examination of the legislative history, that Congress 
meant to ban all restraints that reduce consumer surplus, without regard to overall efficiency 
consequences. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, passim. 
 62. That is, both camps engage in what one might properly call “first generation 
originalism,” which sought to discern the “original intent” of those who drafted the text in 
question by consulting legislative history and other evidence of such subjective meaning.  As 
others have explained, modern originalism has jettisoned this search for subjective intent, 
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invokes evidence that Senator Sherman and others wanted to ban 
combinations that reduced output and increased consumer prices without 
interfering with combinations or other practices that generated productive 
efficiencies, even if such efficiencies hampered rivals.63  By contrast, the 
“purchaser welfare” camp contends that Congress could not have 
understood that the exercise of market power results in a deadweight loss, 
and thus allocative (in)efficiency, with the result that Congress must have 
had in mind some other sort of “harm” that justified regulation.64  As a 
result, this camp focuses on statements suggesting that members of 
Congress believed that consumers were “entitled” to prices set by a 
competitive market, and that practices that increased prices above the 
competitive level abridged this entitlement.65  These proponents concede, as 
they must, that Senator Sherman and others recognized that combinations 
between rivals could create significant productive efficiencies.66  At the 
 
changing the focus to the “original public meaning” of the text under consideration. See 
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999); Randy E. Barnett, 
Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Critique of “Fainthearted Originalism,” 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006) 
(describing the shift, during the 1990s, from originalism focused on “subjective intent” of 
the drafters to an effort to ascertain the “original public meaning” of a document); see also, 
e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997).  To his credit, Professor 
Lande has, in an article prepared for this conference, essayed to offer a textualist argument in 
support of his preferred “purchaser welfare” interpretation of the Sherman Act. Robert H. 
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, 
Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349 
(2013). 
 63. See Bork, supra note 2, at 14–21 (discussing various policy statements in the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act); id. at 26–31 (discussing the consequences of 
proposed rules of law for possible interpretations of the Act).  Thus Bork, for instance, 
emphasizes that members of Congress contemplated an across-the-board ban on price fixing, 
without regard to distributional consequences. See id. at 21–25. 
 64. See Lande, supra note 2, at 88 (“It is extremely unlikely that the legislators’ distaste 
for monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative efficiency:  the 
concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge of discovery by leading economic 
theorists when the Sherman Act was passed.”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s 
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 n.55 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law & 
Economics, and the Courts, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 207–08 (1987) (“[I]t is virtually 
impossible that the Sherman Act could have been crafted with only economic efficiency in 
mind. . . . .  [T]he most straight-forward efficiency argument against cartels and monopoly—
the one the Chicago or [total welfare] school has in mind—refers not to efficiency in 
production but rather to allocative efficiency, which designates the welfare loss due to the 
misallocation of resources resulting from purchase decisions that are based upon super-
competitive prices.  Yet, at the time of the Sherman Act’s passage, this aspect of efficiency 
was making only its first appearance in economics literature, and it was not until decades 
later that economists generally came to understand and apply the concept.”). But cf. Meese, 
supra note 36, at 86 n.42 (quoting Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations for the proposition 
that monopolies “derange . . . natural distribution in the stock of the society” and that “every 
derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful to the society in which 
it takes place”); E.G. West, The Burdens of Monopoly:  Classical Versus Neoclassical, 
44 S. ECON. J. 829, 836–37 (1978) (arguing that Adam Smith understood allocative 
inefficiency as one burden of monopoly). 
 65. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 93–96. 
 66. See id. at 90–91. 
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same time, these proponents emphasize statements by Senator Sherman and 
others that combinations “pocket” such efficiencies instead of passing them 
along to consumers, thus increasing their profits at the expense of 
purchasers.67  Thus, it is said, Sherman and others meant to ban 
combinations that resulted in higher purchaser prices, without regard to 
whether such combinations produced efficiencies, the allocative effects of 
which outweighed any deadweight losses.68  Therefore, these proponents 
say, Sherman and others rejected any suggestion that significant efficiencies 
could validate a transaction that resulted in higher prices for purchasers in 
the relevant market.  These same proponents have reached similar 
conclusions about the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton Act.69 
Most of the dispute over the appropriate definition of “consumer welfare” 
has taken place within the academy, with scholars in the respective camps 
staking out and supporting clear positions.  By contrast, judges have 
declined to embrace either approach wholesale.  For instance, courts 
implementing section 2 of the Sherman Act have, for six decades, embraced 
a total welfare approach, albeit implicitly.70  That is, courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that so-called “competition on the 
merits” is lawful per se, without regard to whether such conduct results in 
higher prices and thus reduces consumers’ surplus.71  The classic example 
of such “competition on the merits,” of course, is the realization of 
economies of scale or other productive efficiencies that allow a firm to 
underprice its less-efficient rivals, exclude them from the market, and thus 
maintain monopoly and associated prices.72  Such conduct, courts have 
 
 67. See id. (“But congressional endorsement of trusts’ efficient operations stopped when 
consumer prices rose, and the legislature withheld approval from combinations that, while 
yielding more efficient methods of competition, also produced higher consumer prices.  The 
trusts were condemned despite their efficiency in large part because they kept the fruits of 
such efficiency.  As Senator Sherman pointed out in qualification of his praise for efficiency, 
‘[i]t is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by 
better methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the 
pockets of the producer.’  Congressional condemnation of monopolistic extractions of wealth 
was so strong that it is even unlikely that Congress meant to provide an exception for a 
monopoly based solely upon superior efficiency.”).  
 68. See id. at 91–92. 
 69. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1588–93 (reviewing section 7’s legislative 
history and concluding that Congress meant to ban any transaction that resulted in higher 
prices without regard to efficiency impact). But cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense 
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 393–402 (1980) 
(reviewing legislative history and concluding that Congress anticipated that the realization of 
productive efficiencies would militate in favor of a merger). 
 70. See Meese, supra note 15. 
 71. See id. at 692–703, 708–15; (collecting and discussing numerous authorities); see 
also, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481–83 (1992) 
(conduct supported by “valid business reasons” cannot violate section 2); United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 
(1954) (per curiam). 
 72. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related 
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1975) 
(explaining how so-called “limit pricing” by a firm operating at a more efficient scale than 
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said, is lawful per se, even if it helps a monopolist protect its dominant 
position.73  As many have recognized, this rule implements and reflects a 
“total welfare” goal for antitrust.74 
By contrast, case law implementing section 1 of the Sherman Act is more 
ambiguous.75  On the one hand, the Supreme Court has, in a section 1 case, 
quoted Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox for the proposition that 
Congress embraced “consumer welfare” as the exclusive goal of antitrust, 
thereby embracing, it seems, a “total welfare” standard.76  In other contexts, 
however, the Court has articulated doctrine in a way that seems to reflect a 
“purchaser welfare” standard.  As noted earlier, both the “purchaser 
welfare” and “total welfare” standards condemn naked horizontal price 
fixing as unlawful per se.77  Most conduct, however, is analyzed under 
section 1’s “Rule of Reason,” under which courts “weigh” or “balance” a 
restraint’s anticompetitive harms against any procompetitive virtues.78  
Within this context, the Supreme Court at least has implied that, for 
purposes of section 1 analysis, proof that a restraint results in prices higher 
than the status quo ante dooms any claim that efficiencies exceed harms.79  
Such a result, with its dispositive focus on price, can only make sense, if at 
 
possible entrants can exclude the latter from the market and thus maintain monopoly). But cf. 
Edlin, supra note 8, at 144 (explaining how courts applying a purchaser welfare standard 
would ban such a practice). 
 73. Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) 
(holding that section 2 does not forbid aggressive above-cost pricing that preserves a 
monopolist’s dominant position); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 
274 (2d Cir. 1979) (“A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred 
from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and efficient 
factory.  These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over the 
market.”). 
 74. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 263, 297–304 (1981) (rejecting liability based upon above-cost “limit pricing” because 
such a standard would encourage entry by less efficient rivals and thus deprive society of 
benefits that would exceed gains from reducing market power); Meese, supra note 15, at 
671–72; Turner, supra note 19, at 1208–09 (endorsing the total welfare standard to govern 
antitrust regulation); id. at 1220–21 (advocating ban on persistent monopolies unless 
resulting from economies of scale, regardless of prices). 
 75. See generally Blair & Sokol, supra note 37 (concluding that section 1 case law is 
ambiguous on this point). 
 76. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the 
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978))).  To be sure, in 1979, Professor Lande had not yet 
articulated his competing definition of “consumer welfare.”  However, there was no doubt at 
the time that Bork and other members of the Chicago school equated “consumer welfare” 
with total welfare. 
 77. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 78. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 79. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (holding 
that benefits purportedly produced by a restraint did not counterbalance the harms for 
purposes of section 1 rule-of-reason analysis given the factual finding that restraint resulted 
in prices higher than they otherwise would have been.). 
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all, under a purchaser welfare standard.80  Indeed, the Court has even 
opined that an asserted benefit is not cognizable in the first place if the 
assertion depends upon the assumption that the challenged restraint will 
result in prices that are higher than the status quo ante.81  At the same time, 
in the very same decision announcing this “rule,” the Court held that 
agreements limiting price and output on their face survive per se 
condemnation because, in some instances, unbridled competition might 
interfere with a well-functioning market and thus hamper interbrand 
competition.82  In short, section 1 jurisprudence leans toward a purchaser 
welfare approach, in contrast to section 2’s clear total welfare approach. 
It may seem surprising that courts have not yet settled upon a definitive 
choice between “purchaser welfare” and total welfare in the section 1 
context.  At the same time, this choice is rarely, if ever, outcome 
determinative, at least in litigated cases.  For instance, the vast majority of 
section 1 cases—over 96 percent—fail because the plaintiffs cannot 
establish a prima facie case that the challenged restraint produces prices 
above the prerestraint level or that output is below it.83  Such proof, of 
course, is a necessary condition for establishing antitrust harm under either 
normative standard.84  Moreover, courts “balance” harms against benefits in 
just over 2 percent of the cases, and the defendant prevailed in nearly all 
such cases (four out of five).85  Moreover, it does not appear that the results 
in these cases turned, at least consciously, on a choice of competing 
standards.  Indeed, in several such cases, courts did not mention “price” at 
all, choosing instead to focus on the purported magnitude of benefits 
without linking those benefits to purchaser welfare.86  Put another way, 
 
 80. It should be noted that price cannot always be dispositive in the section 1 context.  
For instance, some intrabrand restraints, whether horizontal or vertical, survive per se 
condemnation because they can help overcome failures in the distribution market, thereby 
inducing dealers to invest more in promoting the product governed by the restraint. See 
Meese, supra note 36, at 141–44 (discussing the evolution of the case law identifying such 
benefits as cognizable); see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–103 (holding that prevention of a 
market failure is a cognizable benefit, even when challenged restraints limit price and 
output).  The result may be increased costs of distribution, enhanced demand for the product 
in question and thus higher prices. See also Meese, supra note 36, at 145–61.  However, as 
the Supreme Court has recognized, such cost-based price increases do not constitute the sort 
of anticompetitive harm that the Sherman Act condemns. See generally Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 81. See generally Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 82. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–103. 
 83. See Carrier, supra note 40, at 829 (finding that over 96 percent of Rule of Reason 
cases fail for lack of proof of harm under either standard). 
 84. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Carrier, supra note 40, at 829 (reporting the number of cases that entailed 
balancing); id. at 831–33 (describing the results and rationales of such cases). 
 86. For instance, in Reifert v. South. Central Wisconsin MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th 
Cir. 2006).  The court’s entire discussion of balancing consisted of the following three 
sentences:   
The balance between pro- and anti-competitive effects weighs heavily in favor of 
Article 16.  Even in ‘open’ MLS areas such as Massachusetts and Alaska, where 
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these decisions seem to recognize or assume that such efficiencies are 
important in and of themselves, separate and apart from any propensity to 
reduce prices in the relevant market.  If the Supreme Court believes that 
price is the sole relevant variable in Rule of Reason analysis, some lower 
courts have not gotten the word. 
Finally, courts and agencies applying section 7 of the Clayton Act to 
mergers seem to have adopted a purchaser welfare standard.  Thus, 
efficiencies will only save a transaction that creates significant market 
power if such efficiencies prevent price increases or result in lower prices.87  
Even here, however, there is a bit of a caveat.  Both the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have opined that a merger 
creating significant efficiencies may be lawful, even if price rises 
temporarily, so long as there is a prospect that prices will fall in the long 
run.88 
Taken together, Antitrust Law reflects an ambiguous attitude toward the 
appropriate definition of consumer welfare.  On the one hand, there is some 
support in the section 1 case law for a price-based standard, although the 
question is not free from doubt.  However, section 2 case law bends over 
backward to accommodate efficiencies, validating any and all cost-reducing 
conduct by monopolists, even when such conduct results in higher 
purchaser prices.  Put another way, section 2 law apparently treats 
efficiency as an end in itself, the realization of which trumps the welfare of 
purchasers, or at least those purchasers in the relevant market.  On the other 
side of the spectrum, the law governing mergers generally embraces a price-
based standard, but even here there is a caveat. 
 
individuals who have not joined a Realtors Association may access an MLS 
service, users must agree not to solicit the exclusive listings of other MLS users 
during the term of the listing.  If agents were reluctant to post their listings, for fear 
that other agents would steal their clients, the market would become less 
transparent and less efficient.  Article 16 aids competition and fulfills the purposes 
of the Sherman Act by providing a more transparent marketplace. 
Id.  The court made no effort to quantify the benefits that it identified or explain why they 
exceeded the harms. 
 87. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e hold 
that a defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would 
substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result 
in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and, 
hence, consumers.”); 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10 (“[T]he 
Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the 
merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price 
increases in that market.”). 
 88. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10 n.15 (“Efficiencies 
relating to costs that are fixed in the short term are unlikely to benefit customers in the short 
term, but can benefit customers in the longer run, e.g., if they make new product introduction 
less expensive.”). 
 2013] THE (FALSE?) CHOICE 2219 
II.  BOTH CAMPS EMBRACE THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM                          
TRADE-OFF MODEL 
Despite their vehement “legal” disagreements, both camps employ the 
same basic economic tools to illustrate and frame their arguments.  In 
particular, both camps invoke the so-called “partial equilibrium trade-off 
model” to illustrate and bolster their arguments.89  First developed by 
Oliver Williamson in the late 1960s, the model built upon the partial 
equilibrium framework previously developed to ascertain the welfare 
consequences, including the impact on consumer surplus, of departures 
from perfect competition (e.g., monopoly and monopolistic competition).90  
These earlier models had focused on the welfare impact of an exercise of 
market power and the resulting reduction in output, concluding that this 
reduction resulted in a misallocation of resources and reduced consumer 
surplus.91  Williamson reformulated the model to recognize and incorporate 
the impact of productive efficiencies.  To be precise, Williamson developed 
a tool for ascertaining the impact upon total welfare of a merger that both 
confers market power on the resulting firm and results in productive 
efficiencies.92  In so doing, Williamson expanded the focus of the analysis 
to include a consideration of a transaction’s impact on both producer 
surplus and consumer surplus, which, when combined, constituted total 
economic surplus.93  While first developed to analyze mergers, the model 
can have broader application as well, as Williamson himself noted.94 
Proponents of a total welfare approach, including Williamson himself, 
have invoked the partial equilibrium model to illustrate their preferred “total 
welfare” standard.  Indeed, Robert Bork, the leading proponent of the total 
welfare approach, expressly employed the trade-off model to illustrate the 
application of this standard, famously stating that one can employ the trade-
off model to illustrate all antitrust problems.95  According to Bork, producer 
welfare, as defined by the model, should count in the antitrust calculus, with 
 
 89. See Williamson, supra note 20. 
 90. See, e.g., Harberger, supra note 17 (relying upon this model to illustrate deadweight 
loss that occurs because of monopoly pricing). 
 91. See generally J.R. Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers’ Surplus, 8 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 108 (1941) (explaining how monopolistic output reduction distorts the allocation of 
resources and thus reduces consumer surplus and overall economic welfare). 
 92. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 20–21 (articulating this objective of the model); 
see also Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement:  Transition Years, 
17 ANTITRUST 61, 64 (2003) (describing the development of the partial equilibrium trade-off 
model, at the behest of Donald Turner, as a means of evaluating welfare consequences of 
mergers that produce efficiencies and market power). 
 93. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23. 
 94. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the 
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
207 (2003) (describing the role of Williamson’s trade-off model in merger enforcement 
policy); Muris, supra note 69. 
 95. See BORK, supra note 2, at 108 (“This [Williamsonian] diagram can be used to 
illustrate all antitrust problems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors 
involved, allocative efficiency and productive efficiency.”). 
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the result that high prices are not a harm absent some additional reduction 
in allocative efficiency.96  Others, including Williamson himself, have 
invoked the partial equilibrium paradigm in support of this normative 
approach.97 
Moreover, Robert Lande, the original and still chief proponent of the 
purchaser welfare approach, employs partial equilibrium tools to frame his 
claim that Congress implicitly rejected a total welfare approach and meant 
to ban any transactions that reduce purchaser welfare, which Lande equates 
 
 96. See id. at 110–12. 
 97. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 798–99 (2d ed. 1994) (relying upon the Williamson model to illustrate 
efficiency-based antitrust policy); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. 
HARRINGTON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 126–27 (3d ed. 2000) 
(reproducing the same graph and agreeing with Bork that the graph can be used to illustrate 
antitrust problems); Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition:  Kodak 
and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1994) (invoking 
Williamson’s model to illustrate the trade-off between market power and efficiencies when 
analyzing trade restraints); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not 
the Best, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29 (2006); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand “Cartels” 
Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1982) (employing the model to illustrate 
a “consumer welfare” standard applicable to all antitrust problems); Williamson, supra note 
19, at 105 (“The emphasis throughout [this article] is on mergers, but much of the argument 
generalizes easily.”). 
Indeed, reliance on the partial equilibrium model and its implicit total welfare premise 
to inform the normative content of antitrust policy predates Williamson’s explicit 
articulation of the trade-off paradigm.  For instance, even before Robert Bork contended that 
antitrust law should maximize “consumer welfare” as he defined it, Professors Turner, 
Mason, and Kaysen embraced an efficiency-based approach to the antitrust laws 
indistinguishable from Bork’s.  That is, according to these scholars, antitrust law should only 
ban those practices, such as cartel pricing, that create or exercise market power without 
creating offsetting efficiency benefits. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 44–45 
(describing the primary goal of antitrust policy as eliminating “undue market power to the 
extent consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic performance”); id. at 77–79 
(describing the elimination of “unreasonable market power” as the authors’ primary goal); 
id. at 78 (“Market power resting on certain bases we consider ‘reasonable,’ because we think 
it either undesirable or impossible to eliminate them. . . .  [Market power resulting from 
economies of scale] could be reduced only at the cost of producing at higher costs in 
inefficiently small units; this price we do not desire to pay.”); id. at 133–34 (noting that a 
merger that creates market power should be lawful if it is necessary to create productive 
efficiencies).  Moreover, Turner employed the same approach shortly after Williamson 
published his results, albeit without mentioning Williamson. See Turner, supra note 19, at 
1208–09 (assuming that the appropriate goal of economic policy is to “maximize aggregate 
economic wealth” and endorsing the view that economies of scale should justify high 
concentration). Thus, these authors apparently anticipated, or at least accidentally applied, 
Williamson’s conclusion that the realization of nontrivial efficiencies would likely produce 
efficiencies that exceeded allocative losses. See supra note 35 and accompanying text 
(explaining Williamson’s conclusion in this regard). But cf. Williamson, supra note 20, at 64 
(contending that Turner was surprised by Williamson’s conclusion that small efficiencies 
would outweigh allocative losses from a merger to monopoly).  Moreover, like Williamson 
(and Bork), these scholars all implicitly followed the approach taken by Arnold Harberger in 
1954, that is, treated the distributional impact of market power as irrelevant for welfare 
purposes and focused only on the deadweight loss resulting from reduced output as a source 
of harm. See Harberger, supra note 17 (equating “consumer welfare” with total welfare and 
ignoring the distributional impact of market power). 
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with the partial equilibrium model’s concept of consumer surplus.98  In 
particular, Lande employs Williamson’s model to identify and frame the 
question scholars should ask (“did the drafters of the Sherman Act believe 
that producer surplus should count in the antitrust calculus?”) when 
examining the Act’s legislative history.99  Moreover, Lande emphasizes that 
members of Congress assumed that large combinations could create 
significant productive efficiencies of the sort recognized by Williamson’s 
partial equilibrium paradigm but concludes that such combinations would 
“pocket” these efficiencies, thereby depriving consumers of such 
benefits.100  Thus, Lande concludes that the drafters of the Sherman Act 
implicitly rejected the relevance of producer surplus for antitrust analysis 
and thus rejected the “total welfare” definition of consumer welfare.  He 
also invokes the same model to illustrate his preferred normative standard 
(purchaser welfare=consumer surplus).  Other proponents of the “purchaser 
welfare/consumer surplus” approach, all of whom invoke Lande’s work, 
necessarily do the same.101 
Both camps would also make descriptive or technocratic use of the model 
as well.  For instance, Lande contends that courts and enforcement agencies 
can employ the model, at least conceptually, to discern the impact of 
challenged practices on purchaser prices and thus consumer surplus and 
purchaser welfare.102  Moreover, Bork too asserts that the model defines the 
terms of an inquiry into the impact of a restraint.103  Thus, as a descriptive 
 
 98. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 71–80 (discussing the “Economic Effects of 
Monopoly Power,” including “allocative inefficiency,” “reduction in consumer surplus,” and 
possible “productive efficiencies”); id. at 74–77 (discussing the “transfer of ‘Consumers’ 
Surplus’ from Consumers to Monopolists”); id. at 75 (quoting Williamson for the 
proposition that ordinary welfare analysis treats the transfer of consumer surplus to 
producers as a wash). 
 99. See id. at 142–47 (employing Williamson’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to 
illustrate distinction between the total welfare and the purchaser welfare standard in the 
context of evaluating a merger). 
 100. See id. at 90–91 (“The trusts were condemned despite their efficiency in large part 
because they kept the fruits of such efficiency.”). 
 101. See Steven C. Salop, Question:  What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare 
Standard? Answer:  The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 
(2010).  For other examples employing this model to illustrate the distinction between total 
welfare and purchaser welfare standards, see, for example, Sokol & Blair, supra note 37. 
 102. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 220 (“The relative sizes of the dead-weight loss and 
the efficiency gain, in those cases where both exist, depend upon how one draws the 
diagram, and how one should draw the diagram depends entirely upon what economic 
analysis suggests about the reality the curves should reflect.”); Fisher, Lande & Vandaele, 
supra note 57 (employing partial equilibrium methodology to determine conditions under 
which efficiencies result in reduced prices despite merger to monopoly); Fisher & Lande, 
supra note 26, at 1631 (explaining how antitrust enforcers can employ the Williamsonian 
trade-off model while incorporating Congressional concerns over wealth transfers); id. at 
1631 n.181 (contending that one can incorporate concerns about wealth distribution within 
the Williamsonian trade-off model by assigning weights to the competing effects of a 
transaction). 
 103. BORK, supra note 2, at 220 (“The relative sizes of the deadweight loss and the 
efficiency gain, in cases where both exist, depends upon how one draws the diagram, and 
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economic matter, both Lande and Bork necessarily embrace the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model’s various purely economic/modeling 
assumptions, not all of which are entirely realistic. 
This universal embrace of the partial equilibrium trade-off model is not 
surprising.  Such models only achieve their dominant status by solving 
various problems that a scientific community deems important.104 
Moreover, such paradigms reflect significant investments in training and 
repeated application, attributes that solidify a scientific community’s 
commitment to the framework.105  Because of these two factors—social 
utility and a community’s significant investment—scientific paradigms are 
sticky and hard to displace.106  The partial equilibrium trade off paradigm is 
no exception to these principles.  Economists have employed the paradigm 
with success in a variety of contexts, and the community trains its 
practitioners to embrace and apply it widely. 
The trade-off tool that both schools of thought embrace does not purport 
to generate a completely accurate description of economic reality.  For one 
thing, it is costly to gather the information necessary to conduct a true 
partial equilibrium trade-off analysis.107  Moreover, even if a decision 
maker could gather all of the information called for, the model could still 
produce inaccurate results.  It is, after all, a model and thus by definition 
only a proxy for reality.108  Indeed, Williamson himself referred to the 
model as “naïve” and, later, “simple.”109  Finally, as I have shown 
 
how one draws the diagram depends entirely upon what economic analysis suggests about 
the reality the curves should reflect.”). 
 104. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 24 (4th ed. 
2012) (“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors 
in solving a few problems that a group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”). 
 105. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension:  Tradition and Invention in Scientific 
Research, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION:  STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 229 
(1977) (explaining how training that solidifies paradigms creates “mental sets” or 
“Einstellungen”); see also KUHN, supra note 104, at 76 (“So long as the tools a paradigm 
supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest 
and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools.  The reason is 
clear.  As in manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the 
occasion that demands it.”). 
 106. See KUHN, supra note 104, at 77–80 (entrenched paradigms resist change); id. at 78 
(explaining how an incumbent paradigm resists challenges by adjusting itself through “ad 
hoc modifications and articulations” to incorporate seemingly contradictory evidence). 
 107. See BORK, supra note 2, at 221 (“The diagram tells us nothing because there is 
nothing built into it that shows whether there will be any restriction of output in such cases 
or, if there is, what the amount will be.  Without that information we have no idea of the size 
of the dead-weight loss, if any.”). 
 108. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws 
cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. . . .  Rules that 
seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries 
of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek 
to serve.”). 
 109. Williamson, supra note 20, at 20–22 (describing the so-called “naïve” trade-off 
model); id. at 64 (reiterating that the model was naïve and “simple”).  Note that many of 
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elsewhere, application of this paradigm has produced misleading doctrinal 
tests in some contexts, particularly the treatment of partial vertical 
integration that survives per se treatment because it may overcome market 
failure.110 
This mutual embrace of the “naïve” partial equilibrium paradigm, its 
simplifying assumptions, the problematic results it produces, and courts’ 
inconsistent embrace of the “purchaser” and “total” welfare standard raises 
an obvious question, that is, is there some other set of economic tools that 
can help (re)frame the debate about the appropriate welfare criterion to be 
applied in the antitrust context?  One obvious alternative would be the 
General Equilibrium Model.  After all, neither the Sherman Act nor its 
legislative history mentions or endorses the partial equilibrium trade-off 
model or any of its components (e.g., consumer surplus or producer 
surplus), at least by name.  Moreover, as other scholars have noted, 
members of Congress were likely unaware of Alfred Marshall’s work, 
which first articulated the partial equilibrium model, thereby further 
attenuating the possibility that they meant to embrace a “total welfare” or 
“consumer surplus” standard, at least as such.111  In any event, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that courts may embrace new and better 
economic models for evaluating challenged conduct, even to the point of 
overruling previous decisions that rested upon old and now discredited 
models.112  Indeed, failure to embrace a new and better model (if there is 
 
these assumptions derive from perfect competition. See infra notes 137–39 and 
accompanying text (describing the influence of perfect competition on the partial 
equilibrium model). 
 110. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:  
Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 503–23 
(2010). 
 111. See Lande, supra note 2, at 88 (“It is extremely unlikely that the legislators’ distaste 
for monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative efficiency:  the 
concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge of discovery by leading economic 
theorists when the Sherman Act was passed.”).  Some proponents of the “purchaser welfare” 
approach have argued that congressional ignorance of Alfred Marshall’s work rebuts the 
claim that the Sherman Act incorporates an “allocative efficiency” standard. See Kaplow, 
supra note 64, at 207–08 (explaining the date of Marshall’s contribution and contending that 
it is “inconceivable that members of Congress were motivated at all by such an argument”).  
However, if Congress was ignorant of Alfred Marshall’s work, then they were also ignorant 
of the concept of consumer surplus. See Miroslav Svoda, History and Troubles of Consumer 
Surplus, 2008 PRAGUE ECON. PAPERS, 230 (explaining that Marshall coined the term 
“consumer surplus” and popularized the concept in the English-speaking world).  Ironically, 
no one doubts that the 1890 Congress understood the concept of productive efficiency. See 
supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.  If, as Oliver Williamson and F.M. Scherer have 
suggested, productive efficiency is simply one aspect of allocative efficiency, then perhaps 
scholars like Professor Kaplow have been too hasty in their conclusion that Congress could 
not have deemed allocative efficiency as the predominant goal of the Sherman Act. 
 112. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs., Inc. v. Sharp Elecs., Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 732 (1988) (holding that the Sherman Act embraced the common law along with its 
“dynamic potential” and that courts should adjust antitrust doctrine to account for advances 
in economic theory). 
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one) would seem to contravene the Sherman Act’s requirement that courts 
employ “reason” to determine whether a restraint produces the 
“consequences of monopoly” or, instead, “fructifies” and “advances” 
trade.113  Perhaps there is a different model that can inform antitrust’s 
assessment of challenged conduct, a model that can help reframe the debate 
over the appropriate normative content of antitrust, even to the point of 
generating a consensus between now-competing camps.  Thus, some 
reexamination of the partial equilibrium trade-off model would seem 
appropriate. 
III.  THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM TRADE-OFF MODEL114 
Every antitrust scholar and practitioner has employed and invoked the 
partial equilibrium trade-off model, often without even knowing it.  First 
expressly articulated by Oliver Williamson in 1968, the model builds upon 
the more basic partial equilibrium framework that Alfred Marshall first 
developed in the late nineteenth century for evaluating the welfare 
consequences of perfect competition and monopoly.115  The model begins 
by positing a particular “industry,” isolated from every other industry in the 
economy, except to the extent that the industry must purchase inputs from 
other industries.116  The “industry” consists of two categories of actors:  
firms, who manufacture products, and consumers, who, depending upon the 
price, purchase them.  Such industries correspond (roughly) to the antitrust 
concept of a “relevant market,” defined for the purpose of evaluating claims 
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.117 
Scholars and practitioners employ a familiar graphical apparatus to 
represent the model.  The model begins with two axes:  the vertical axis 
represents the price of the product, and the horizontal axis represents the 
quantity demanded by consumers or supplied by the industry’s firms, as 
 
 113. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911) (approving common 
law decisions that had repudiated previous doctrine because of the advent of “more accurate 
economic conceptions”). 
 114. Readers may omit this part if they are familiar with the model. 
 115. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890); see also Harberger, 
supra note 17, at 78 (graphically illustrating welfare loss from monopoly output reduction). 
 116. See generally Brian J. Loasby, Hypothesis and Paradigm in the Theory of the Firm, 
81 ECON. J. 863, 876 (1971) (explaining how the pioneers of imperfect competition theory 
retained the concept of an “industry” implied by the partial equilibrium model). Cf. 
Harberger, supra note 17, at 84 (explaining that the assignment of firms to particular 
industries obscured underlying distinctions between firms’ products and thus overstated the 
competitive overlap between such products). 
 117. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 453 (1993) (holding 
that an attempted monopolization claim depends upon proof that there is a “dangerous 
probability” that the defendant will achieve power in a properly defined relevant market); 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34–35 (1984) (determining that 
proof of power in a relevant market is necessary to establish a per se tying violation). 
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appropriate.118  Beginning with these two axes, the model employs the 
familiar “demand schedule” to encapsulate all relevant information about 
actual and potential consumers who purchase or may purchase the 
industry’s product.119  This demand curve slopes down and to the right, 
indicating that consumers will purchase more of the product, holding 
everything else constant, as its price falls.120  The slope of the curve turns 
on just how sensitive or “elastic” demand is to changes in price, a factor 
that depends, among other things, upon the extent to which products 
manufactured in other industries nominally not incorporated in the model 
are close substitutes for those produced by the industry in question.121 
The model also posits a supply curve, which represents how much output 
the industry will produce at any given price.122  Just as the demand curve 
aggregates information about responses by individual consumers to price 
changes, so too does the industry supply curve incorporate and reflect 
aggregate responses to price changes by individual firms, not all of whom 
are necessarily present in the industry at a given moment in time.123  As a 
result, the location and shape of the industry-wide supply curve will 
necessarily depend upon the location and shapes of individual firm-level 
supply curves. 
Two different factors will determine the shape of these curves, namely, 
technology and the price of various inputs that firms might employ in the 
production process.  The former will determine the various possible input 
combinations (labor, capital, and raw materials) that firms might employ to 
produce a given unit of output.  The latter will determine which particular 
process and thus which input combination firms will employ given the 
assumption that firms will employ the least costly method of production.124  
Given these data, then, we can construct curves for each individual firm that 
represent both the marginal and average costs of producing each possible 
level of output, from zero units to infinity.  From these curves, in turn, we 
can derive how much output, if any, a given firm will produce at a given 
price.  In the long run, of course, firms will set output where price equals 
marginal cost, so long as that price also exceeds average total cost.125 
 
 118. See KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 20–21 (2d 
ed. 1974). 
 119. See id. at 14–20. 
 120. See id. at 14–20, 241–45. 
 121. See id. at 25–29; see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 99 (describing the 
concept of elasticity and how the extent of elasticity depends upon the “availability of 
substitute products”). 
 122. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 14. 
 123. See id. (explaining how the industry supply curve reflects a compilation of supply 
decisions by all of the industry’s individual firms). 
 124. See id. at 119 (adopting the proposition that firms will always choose the least costly 
method of production). 
 125. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 288 (6th ed. 2011) (“The 
competitive firm’s long-run supply curve is the portion of its marginal cost curve that lies 
above average total cost.”). 
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Very often, economists portray the cost curves of individual firms as 
follows:  marginal cost curves slope up and to the right, while average cost 
curves are U-shaped.126  This portrayal reflects two assumptions.  First, 
production requires a certain “fixed” or “set up” cost, with the result that 
average production costs are high at low levels of output but fall steadily 
other things being equal as output rises.  Second, the incremental cost of 
producing a given level of output rises along with the firm’s output, a 
phenomenon attributable to any number of factors.127  For instance, as a 
firm’s output rises, its inputs may become more expensive and/or of 
reduced quality.  Or, a firm may be unable to vary certain inputs as rapidly 
as others, thereby forcing the firm to rely upon a less than efficient 
combination of inputs.128  Finally, the upward slope may simply reflect an 
underlying technology that exhibits decreasing returns to scale, even 
assuming constant input prices and complete flexibility of input use.129 
Regardless of why the marginal cost curve slopes upward, it will 
intersect the average cost curve at its minimum point and then continually 
rise faster and more steeply than the average cost curve.130  Thus, so long as 
price exceeds average total cost at this point, any firm will maximize its 
profits by producing where price equals marginal costs.  At the same time, 
such a price and resulting output will not last long in a competitive market, 
as supranormal prices will draw additional firms into the market, thereby 
driving price back down to that level equal to minimum average cost and 
eliminating any excess profits.131 
Despite the ordinary portrayal of firm-level curves as “U-shaped,” 
Williamson’s articulation of the trade-off model employs a horizontal 
average cost curve as the industry supply curve, albeit without explaining 
 
 126. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 153–54 (explaining how and why average cost 
curves are often assumed to be U-shaped). 
 127. See id. at 153 (explaining that “upper limit on the availability of some input” and “a 
minimum outlay on some input” combine to create U-shaped cost curves). 
 128. See id. at 134–37 (describing the impact of input limitation on cost curves). 
 129. See id. at 132–33 (describing the impact of decreasing returns to scale on cost 
curves). 
 130. See id. (describing the impact of decreasing returns to scale on cost curves); id. at 
134–37 (describing the impact of input limitation on cost curves).  Moreover, economists 
often posit a distinction between “marginal” and “average” costs, with the later including 
“fixed” or “set up” costs, that is, costs that the firm necessarily incurs regardless of its level 
of output.  Given this assumption, the rising marginal cost curve intersects the average total 
cost curve at its lowest point, and then continues rising at a steeper slope than the average 
total cost curve, the latter of which by definition incorporates information about the costs of 
all of a firm’s output, including that output produced at a relatively low cost. 
 131. If price is below firms’ minimum average cost, then firms will not produce any 
output.  If price rises above minimum average cost, then incumbent firms will increase their 
output to where price equals marginal cost, a point at which price and this average revenue 
will exceed average cost.  Because price exceeds average cost at this level of output, each 
firm will earn an above-normal return—a return that will attract new entrants.  The 
additional output supplied by these new entrants will push price back down to the point 
where cost equals average total cost. 
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the source of such a curve.132  Moreover, this portrayal applies even to 
monopolized industries occupied by a single firm, the result of the merger 
to monopoly that Williamson posits.133  There are, however, two possible 
explanations for such a horizontal cost curve.  First, if all firms (and 
potential firms) in the industry have access to the same technology, then an 
indefinite number of firms will enjoy the same minimum average cost.  
Moreover, if, taken together, these firms employ only a small portion of 
various factors of production available, then the cost of such inputs will 
remain constant and independent of industry output.  Taken together, these 
two assumptions—perfectly replicable technology and constant input 
costs—will result in a horizontal supply curve for the industry in question, 
even though each individual firm enjoys fixed costs and a U-shaped cost 
curve.134  Second, contrary to the assumption of U-shaped cost curves 
mentioned above, each individual firm might experience horizontal cost 
curves, reflecting the absence of fixed costs, constant returns to scale, and 
the ability to vary all inputs with impunity.135  If so, then marginal cost will 
equal average cost for each firm in the relevant industry, and the supply 
curve will be flat throughout.  Indeed, unlike Williamson himself, some 
who reproduce Williamson’s diagram have labeled this cost curve as a 
horizontal marginal cost curve, thereby implying this second explanation 
for constant industry costs.136  This second explanation, of course, must be 
the implicit explanation for a horizontal average cost curve for a 
monopolized industry.  In such cases the firm’s supply curve is the 
 
 132. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 21–22.  He also posits such a curve for a 
postmerger monopolist. See id. at 23; see also Harberger, supra note 17, at 77 (articulating 
the assumption that long run average costs are “close to constant in the relevant range” 
because “in the long run, resources can be allocated among our manufacturing industries in 
such a way as to yield roughly constant returns”). 
 133. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 21–23. 
 134. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 97 (noting that the long-run industry 
supply curve could be flat for this reason  “as long as the industry accounts for only a small 
fraction of any one factor’s total employment”); id. (explaining that the long-run industry 
supply curve might be upward sloping if “there are only a few firms that can produce at low 
costs”).  Note that this result follows even if firms cannot completely vary all of their inputs 
in the short run.  If this phenomenon results in upward sloping marginal cost curves for 
individual firms, then additional firms employing the same technology can produce at a scale 
small enough to avoid this constraint. 
 135. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 129–31 (describing such “unconstrained” 
horizontal cost curves resulting from constant returns to scale); id. at 141–47 (describing and 
illustrating cost curves with fixed costs and (eventual) constant returns to scale).  Here again, 
the industry would have to account for a small proportion of the inputs in question, thereby 
ensuring a constant cost of inputs.  Of course, the presence of fixed costs is consistent with a 
horizontal average cost curve for all levels of output above a certain quantity, whereby 
marginal cost equals average cost after the impact of fixed costs is exhausted. See id. at 146–
47.  Such an effect assumes that marginal cost is itself constant at all levels of output above 
where marginal and average cost becomes equal. See id. 
 136. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798–99; Blair & Sokol, supra note 
37, at 483, 488, 494, 499; Heyer, supra note 19.  Another source simply abjures both 
“marginal cost” and “average cost” and simply refers to “the supply curve.” See SCHERER & 
ROSS, supra note 57, at 186–87. 
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industry’s supply curve; thus, if the individual firm experienced fixed costs, 
the industry curve would not be horizontal. 
Of course, the intersection of the demand and supply curves describes the 
industry’s equilibrium output and resulting market price, at least in the short 
run.  So far we have said nothing about the implications of the model for 
total economic welfare or purchaser welfare.  Thus far the model as 
described is consistent with various assumptions of perfect competition.137  
In a competitive market, price will equal marginal cost, and producers will 
earn normal profits, that is, recoup their costs plus a reasonable rate of 
return.  Consumers, however, receive significant surplus; the downward-
sloping demand curve indicates that nearly all of those who in fact purchase 
the industry’s product were willing to pay more for it than the market 
price.138  Thus, the area between the market price and the demand curve 
indicates the amount of surplus that consumers derive from the industry’s 
output.139 
The partial equilibrium paradigm can also evaluate the welfare 
consequences of departures from perfect competition, however.  For 
instance, what about monopoly and the resulting reduction in output below 
the equilibrium level described above (a reduction resulting from the 
exercise of market power)?  Other things being equal, such a reduction in 
output below this equilibrium level will increase prices and thus reduce 
consumer surplus in two distinct ways.  First, fewer consumers will 
purchase the industry’s product and thus forgo the surplus they otherwise 
would have received as a result of such purchases.140  Second, other 
 
 137. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 76–81 (1921) 
(detailing various assumptions of the perfect competition model).  For instance, as explained 
in the text, the model apparently assumes that production technology is freely available to all 
firms, including potential entrants, thereby justifying an industry-wide horizontal average 
cost curve. See F.A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC 
ORDER 92, 97–98 (1948) (describing the assumption of the perfect competition model that “a 
large number of people are producing the same commodity and command the same objective 
facilities and opportunities for doing so”); KNIGHT, supra, at 78 (describing perfect 
competition’s assumption that knowledge is freely available). 
 138. See Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13. 
 139. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 24–25; Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13. 
 140. See Harberger, supra note 17, at 78; Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13.  Of course, 
these consumers will spend the income they would have spent on the industry’s product 
elsewhere.  However, the Marshallian model assumes that such expenditures will produce 
little or no surplus, with the result that the reduction in surplus in the primary market indeed 
represents the full reduction in overall consumer surplus.  As one scholar has put it:  “The 
[Marshallian] consumer surplus triangle DAF is constructed on the assumption that if this 
particular commodity was withdrawn from the market, the consumers would have to fritter 
away their money outlay of OHAF [the rectangle equal to output times price] in increasing 
their marginal purchases of other commodities from which they will obtain only a negligible 
amount of surplus.  (If we draw consumers’ surplus diagrams for other commodities, this 
will be shown by small triangular increments at the margin.)  This is true even when there 
are substitutes for the particular commodity, for in constructing the demand curve for it, 
Marshall had already assumed that consumers will take full account of the fact that 
substitutes are available at given prices.  Thus (subject to the assumption of constant 
marginal utility of money) the triangle under the demand curve measures the consumers’ 
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consumers will continue to purchase the product in question, albeit at a 
higher price, thereby deriving less surplus per purchase than they derived in 
a competitive market.141  According to the “purchaser welfare” camp, both 
such reductions in consumer surplus represent a “harm” under the antitrust 
statutes.142  By contrast, the total welfare camp would conclude that only 
the first (and relatively small) reduction in surplus constitutes antitrust 
harm, as the second reduction represents a mere transfer of income from 
producers to consumers and thus does not itself reduce welfare.143  Still, 
both camps would agree that, based upon an application of the partial 
equilibrium model, transformation of an industry from perfect competition 
to monopoly and the resulting output reduction will, other things being 
equal, produce cognizable harm and should thus, without more, justify 
antitrust regulation.144 
Of course, all else is not always equal; there is often “more.”  One must 
also ask how an industry became monopolized in the first place.  One 
possibility, of course, is predatory tactics, whereby a firm excludes rivals on 
some basis other than superior efficiency.145  Monopoly acquired in this 
manner would, according to the partial equilibrium model, both reduce total 
welfare and purchaser welfare, albeit not by the same amounts, and thus 
properly be subject to condemnation.146  Another possibility is that once- 
independent participants in an industry may merge to form a monopoly.  
Absent some resulting technological change, the partial equilibrium model 
predicts that such a merger would, like the predatory activity just described, 
reduce both total welfare and purchaser welfare. 
There is one last possibility, namely, that transformation from 
competition to monopoly enables the realization of technological or other 
efficiencies that reduce production costs.  Such a transformation can occur 
in two ways.  First, a single firm in a once-competitive market can realize 
such efficiencies through “internal expansion,” whereby it realizes 
efficiencies and underprices it rivals, driving those rivals from the market 
and obtaining a monopoly.147  Second, all the firms in the once-competitive 
 
surplus on this commodity only because the money outlay which yields a surplus in this 
particular use will become marginal expenditure elsewhere.” See HLA MYINT, THEORIES OF 
WELFARE ECONOMICS 162 (1965). 
 141. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 135 (distinguishing between “monopoly 
profits” and “deadweight loss,” both of which result from exercise of monopoly power). 
 142. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text; see also Harberger, supra note 17 
(finding that economy-wide harm from deadweight loss resulting from monopolistic prices 
equaled less than 1 percent of GDP). 
 144. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text; see also Williamson, supra note 45. 
 145. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S 585, 605 (1985) 
(quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626b (1978)); see also 
BORK, supra note 2, at 160 (defining “improper exclusion,” as “exclusion not the result of 
superior efficiency” (cited with approval in Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 603 n.29)). 
 146. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 160, 344–45. 
 147. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 25–26. 
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market can merge, creating a monopoly and thereby realizing productive 
efficiencies that are not available to competitive, smaller firms.148 
Williamson’s articulation and application of the partial equilibrium 
model focused on the second source of efficiencies.149  That is, Williamson 
posited that the combination of previously separate firms could allow the 
newly created firm to realize efficiencies that were not available to any of 
the previously separate firms.  In Williamson’s account, the efficiencies 
manifested themselves as a downward shift in the horizontal average 
cost/supply curve and resulting reduction in the cost of producing the 
industry’s remaining output.150  While Williamson did not describe the 
exact source of such efficiencies, there are a few possibilities.  For instance, 
the new firm could perhaps take advantage of production technologies that 
require a certain scale of output not available to smaller firms.151 
Although he dubbed them “productive efficiencies,” Williamson 
recognized that such efficiencies represented an improvement in the 
allocation of resources, given that the new firm could produce the same 
output with fewer resources.152  He also recognized that this allocational 
improvement could offset the negative allocational consequences of market 
power resulting from the posited merger to monopoly.153  Recognizing this 
tradeoff, Williamson sought to arrive at generalizations about the welfare 
consequences of mergers to monopoly that both reduced output in a 
particular industry while at the same time reducing production costs.154  
William conceded that such transactions could, despite efficiencies, 
 
 148. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798–99. 
 149. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21 (“The effects on resource allocation of a 
merger that yields economies but extends market power can be investigated in a partial 
equilibrium context.”).  Of course, Williamson did not claim to be the first to recognize that 
mergers could create such efficiencies.  Indeed, nearly two decades earlier, Professors 
Kaysen and Turner had anticipated Williamson’s general result, contending that mergers that 
create market power should nonetheless be lawful if they also resulted in substantial 
efficiencies, without regard to price effects. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 
133–34. At the same time, as Williamson noted, Kaysen and Turner basically “fudged” the 
definition of “substantial,” leaving Williamson to construct a framework for assessing the 
trade-off between market power and efficiencies. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 20; see 
also Williamson, supra note 20, at 64 (describing how Williamson examined the trade-off 
question at Turner’s behest). 
 150. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23. 
 151. See, e.g., LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 155–57 (describing technological 
indivisibilities that give rise to reduced production costs at higher levels of output); id. at 157 
(representing such indivisibilities with a downward shift in the marginal and average cost 
curves). 
 152. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 22 n.4 (explaining that “[productive] inefficiency 
is also a dead-weight loss”); id. at 22 (“The net allocative effect [of a transaction] is given by 
the difference [between deadweight welfare loss and productive efficiency gains].”). 
 153. See id. at 21–22; see also SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 22 (explaining that 
productive inefficiency resulting from failure to realize available economies of scale 
“represents a deadweight loss of resources that could otherwise be employed in alternative 
production”). 
 154. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–22. 
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increase prices and thus reduce consumer surplus.155  Nonetheless, he 
concluded that mergers to monopoly that produced significant cost savings 
generally increased overall welfare, despite any resulting price increase.156 
IV.  SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODEL 
As its name implies, the partial equilibrium trade-off model does not 
necessarily tell the whole story about the impact of a transaction on 
economic welfare.  Indeed, even Williamson himself has repeatedly 
referred to the model as the “naïve” and “simple” trade-off model.157  To be 
sure, the model is not as “simple” or “naïve” as perfect competition.  For 
instance, the model assumes economies of scale (the source of productive 
efficiencies and thus cost reductions), barriers to entry (necessary to protect 
the merger-created monopoly), and transaction costs sufficient to prevent 
consumers from bargaining with the postmerger monopolist to induce an 
output increase via price discrimination.158  Nonetheless, the model 
embraces other assumptions of perfect competition, including (at least 
implicitly) competition (and thus marginal cost pricing) in all other 
markets.159  More generally, the model rests upon the identification of a 
“relevant market,” itself a fiction, completely isolated from other 
(presumed) relevant product markets.160  As a result, the model 
 
 155. See id. at 27–28 (recognizing that a merger that increases price will reduce consumer 
surplus). 
 156. See id. at 21–23. 
 157. See id. at 21. 
 158. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 69–71 (explaining that, absent transaction costs, 
consumers would bargain to induce monopolists to increase output to a competitive level).  
Presumably Calabresi had in mind a price discrimination scheme, whereby firms expand 
output by charging different firms different prices. See also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 
44, at 438–39 (explaining how perfect price discrimination can result in “monopolistic” 
output identical to competitive output). See generally G.L.S. SHACKLE, THE YEARS OF HIGH 
THEORY 13 (1967) (explaining how the possibility of increasing returns to scale undermined 
perfect competition by inducing a single firm to take over the market). 
 159. See VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 75–76 (explaining how 
departures from perfect competition necessitate the embrace of a partial equilibrium model 
and the resulting limiting assumptions); see also HAYEK, supra note 137, at 94 (“Most 
[assumptions of the perfect competition model] are equally assumed in the discussion of the 
various ‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 
‘perfections.’”); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 67 n.25 (assuming, without 
explanation, that “the equality of private and social costs, especially in the areas relevant to 
our study, is not a major problem.”); Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production 
Costs, and the Passage of Time, in COASEAN ECONOMICS:  LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE 
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 2–3 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1997) (noting that pioneers 
of oligopoly theory invoked various assumptions of the perfect competition model). 
 160. See Orbach, supra note 2, at 138–39; see also Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 
1626 n.173 (“In real-world markets, one rarely encounters situations such as a court’s model.  
A wide variety of firms create heterogeneous products of differing substitutability.  
Regardless of where a court draws the market boundaries, not every product included in the 
market is a perfect substitute, nor are excluded goods nonsubstitutable.  Some items not 
included in the market may, to varying degrees, constrain the monopoly power of included 
firms, and therefore should be considered in any analysis of market power.”); Harberger, 
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intentionally ignores the impact of the transaction and its resulting impact 
on production costs and output upon other markets.161  For instance, the 
model ignores the existence of any externalities, positive or negative, that 
the industry might impose or confer on individuals and/or firms in other 
markets.162  This exclusion of such externalities is by fiat; it does not flow 
from any other assumptions of the model and is in fact inconsistent with the 
assumption of transaction costs.163  Thus, the model would condemn a 
transaction that reduced output in an industry characterized by externalities, 
even if the correlative reduction in externalities increases welfare in other 
markets so much as to more than offset the welfare loss in the original 
market.164 
Perhaps more famously, the model ignores more traditional “second 
best” considerations that can undermine the model’s conclusion in 
 
supra note 17, at 84 (explaining how assumed “industries” likely include “products which 
are only remote substitutes” for each other); George J. Stigler, The Economist and the 
Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 8–9 (1982) (“Consider the problem of defining 
a market, within which the existence of competition or some form of monopoly is to be 
determined.  The typical antitrust case is an almost impudent exercise in economic 
gerrymandering.”). 
 161. See, e.g., VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76 (explaining how 
partial equilibrium tools focus on impacts in a particular market to avoid second-best 
problems presented by general equilibrium analysis when some markets are characterized by 
monopoly, externalities, and other departures from perfect competition); Richard H. Fink, 
General and Partial Equilibrium Theory in Bork’s Antitrust Analysis, 2 CONTEMP. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 12, 15 (1984) (explaining that the partial equilibrium model assumes away the 
impact of a market upon other markets); Arnold C. Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for 
Applied Welfare Economics:  An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 785, 789–91 
(1971) (conceding that welfare analyses performed by economists are usually partial 
equilibrium in nature but also arguing that general equilibrium welfare analyses of such 
problems are possible); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 
125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 702 n.10 (1977) (“Partial equilibrium analysis involves an 
examination of one market while assuming that incomes, other prices, and production 
conditions remain unchanged.  Second-order interdependencies are thus assumed to be 
negligible.  When changes in the relevant market do affect the general economy, a general 
equilibrium analysis, in which prices and quantities for all markets must be determined 
together, is usually appropriate.”); see also LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 12–13 (explaining 
how microeconomists generally employ such “partial analysis” when examining the impact 
of price on demand and supply in a particular market). 
 162. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 22 n.4 (articulating the model’s assumption that 
the private costs of the firms in the industry equal the social costs of the activity). 
 163. To be sure, one could posit the existence of such costs within the market while 
assuming zero intermarket costs.  There is, however, no indication that Williamson or other 
practitioners of the model employed such an assumption. 
 164. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 148 (explaining how monopolization of 
an industry characterized by negative externalities can improve overall economic welfare by 
reducing output and thus reducing harm from externalities); Daniel Crane, Harmful Output 
in the Antitrust Domain:  Lessons from the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321 (2005) 
(contending that antitrust law should consider such externalities); see also Orbach, supra 
note 2, at 152 (discussing how conventional antitrust measures of “consumer welfare” ignore 
the possible negative impact of industry output on the consumers who purchase the products 
in question). 
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particular cases.165  Such considerations may arise if other markets in the 
economy are already monopolized and thus characterized by reduced output 
and resulting prices significantly above cost.  In such circumstances, 
merger-induced monopoly output reduction and the transfer of resources to 
previously monopolized markets may actually improve overall welfare by 
increasing output (and reducing significant distortions) in regions of such 
monopolists’ inframarginal output characterized by significant price-cost 
gaps and thus large distortions.166  Indeed, such an improvement can occur 
even if a merger produces no productive efficiencies whatsoever.  
Nonetheless, the partial equilibrium model excludes such considerations by 
fiat, thereby compelling condemnation of some practices that, while 
reducing welfare in a particular market, in fact result in a more efficient 
allocation of resources in the economy as a whole. 
Proponents of the partial equilibrium model assert that the exclusion of 
impacts on other markets is necessary to generate definitive conclusions 
about the welfare consequences of studied transactions or practices.167  
There may, in fact, be good reasons to ignore externalities and other second 
best problems when evaluating the welfare consequences of a merger or 
other practice or transaction that might produce market power.  For 
 
 165. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 113–15 (contending that antitrust analysis should 
generally take a partial equilibrium approach that ignores possible second-best 
considerations); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 12 (embracing the so-called 
“Pigouvian assumption” that “we can apply the concept of efficiency to individual industries 
and firms,” even though “economy-wide efficiency is impossible to achieve” because of 
second-best considerations); VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76 
(explaining that partial equilibrium analysis obviates the need to examine second-best 
considerations); Williamson, supra note 161, at 711–12. 
 166. See Hicks, supra note 91, at 114 (explaining how output reduction in a previously 
competitive market could actually enhance overall welfare by transferring resources to 
industries characterized by market power and above-cost pricing, thereby removing 
significant distortions in the allocation of resources); id. at 114–15 (explaining how such 
considerations establish that output in a competitive market might be above the social 
optimum).  Or, as Williamson himself put it:  “Certain economic effects may therefore go 
undetected, and occasionally behavior which appears to yield net economic benefits in a 
partial equilibrium analysis will result in net losses when investigated in a general 
equilibrium context.  Such a condition has been shown to exist in an economy in which 
monopoly exists in many sectors.  Thus, whereas partial equilibrium analysis indicates that 
an increase in the monopoly price in any one sector invariably yields a loss, viewed more 
generally such an isolated price increase may actually lead to a desirable reallocation of 
resources.” See Williamson, supra note 20, at 23. 
 167. Thus, a leading text on antitrust and regulation explains the usefulness of the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model as follows:  “[Outside of perfect competition] it becomes 
incredibly complex to deal with a general equilibrium model in which some markets are 
monopolies, externalities exist, imperfect information about product quality obtains, and so 
on.  Hence, we now turn to welfare economics concepts in the context of a single market, 
effectively ignoring the interactions with all other markets.” VISCUSI, VERNON & 
HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76; Loasby, supra note 116, at 864 (“Micro-economics, on the 
other hand, simply assumes away some of the interdependencies which form the subject-
matter of macro-system analysis.”). But see Harberger, supra note 161, at 789–91 (decrying 
the tendency of economists to ignore the impact of studied practices on more than one 
market). 
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instance, it seems unlikely that antitrust law provides the optimal regulatory 
tool for dealing with most, if not all, externalities.  For one thing, 
substantial bodies of private and public law deal expressly with 
externalities; think of the common law of nuisance as well as state and 
federal environmental regulation, all three of which seek to regulate 
externalities resulting from the unreasonable use of real property.168  Given 
these three bodies of law, there is simply no regulatory void for antitrust to 
fill in many circumstances.  To be sure, externalities may still exist despite 
these bodies of law, but the existence of such externalities does not thereby 
justify their consideration by antitrust courts.  For one thing, not all 
externalities are inefficient; sometimes soot spewing from a factory onto a 
farmer’s land is the most efficient use of the farmer’s property, whether or 
not the factory owner pays for the use.169  Moreover, the cost of eliminating 
even inefficient externalities will not always exceed the benefits of doing 
so.170  Just as there is an optimal amount of crime and other forms of law 
violation, given the cost of deterrence, there is also an optimal level of 
inefficient externalities.171  Indeed, Ronald Coase has opined that the 
ubiquity of (inefficient?) externalities raises a presumption that the cost of 
correcting such market failures exceeds the welfare benefits of doing so.172  
If Coase is correct, then the case for assigning this objective to antitrust, 
where more appropriate bodies of law have failed, is weak indeed.173  
Simply put, the continuing presence of externalities despite the presence of 
various regulatory regimes designed to combat them does not begin to 
justify the incorporation of externality concerns into antitrust analysis. 
Or, consider the example of tobacco.  On the one hand, the product 
seems plainly harmful, both  to the user, who does not internalize the entire 
harm, but also to third parties, by means of second-hand smoke.  Thus, 
some have argued that antitrust law should tolerate collusive arrangements 
among cigarette manufacturers, for instance, given that such agreements 
will reduce consumption of a harmful product.174  However, both state and 
national governments already regulate tobacco quite heavily by means of 
warning labels, public service announcements, outright smoking bans and, 
most importantly, taxes justified on both revenue generation and regulatory 
grounds.  For all we know, cigarettes and other forms of tobacco might be 
 
 168. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 169. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
 170. See R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET, AND THE LAW 26, 26 (1988) (contending that the ubiquity of externalities implies 
that the elimination of such phenomena is not always cost-justified). 
 171. See generally supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 172. Coase, supra note 170, at 26. 
 173. See also BORK, supra note 2, at 114–15 (making an unpersuasive argument that the 
consideration of externalities in antitrust analysis is inappropriate because such a 
consideration entails questions of income distribtion).   
 174. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition:  Market Failures, Total 
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second Best Trade-offs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 
887–89 (2000). 
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overregulated.175  Any court that sought to incorporate the reduction in such 
externalities as part of its evaluation of, say, a cartel of cigarette producers 
would take on a task worthy of the most zealous central planner.  If 
entertaining a “reasonable price defense” sets sail on a “sea of doubt,” then 
allowing for an “externalities defense” to cartel agreements will surely sink 
the entire antitrust fleet.176 
Similar considerations may well justify ignoring more traditional second-
best concerns.  As some have explained, recognition of such a defense 
would require tribunals and agencies to gather significantly more 
information than necessary to evaluate the industry-specific consequences 
of acts such as a merger or price fixing arrangement.177  For instance, in 
addition to determining whether a transaction creates or facilitates the 
exercise of market power, the tribunal would have to determine the 
magnitude of any resulting output reduction as well as the size of the 
resulting deadweight loss.  The tribunal would also have to determine the 
ultimate destination of the now-available various forms of resources (e.g., 
labor, energy, and raw materials) previously employed to produce the 
forgone output.178  Such output reductions would, by definition, be “at the 
margin” and leave most of an industry’s output intact.  Moreover, having 
determined this destination (or destinations), the tribunal would have to 
determine whether such other markets are themselves beset with market 
power and, if so, by how much—presumably defining relevant product and 
geographic markets to do so.  In the end, this process could lead to a 
determination that the (marginal) resources in question flowed to markets 
that were generally competitive or nearly so, thereby confirming, at great 
cost, the conclusions of a partial equilibrium analysis.  In the end, such a 
long drawn out inquiry would impose significant costs on the parties and 
the legal system while at the same time undermining the per se rule against 
cartel pricing, for instance, by necessitating a fact-intensive analysis about 
the collateral consequences of an admitted output reduction.179  Indeed, if 
 
 175. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 12–13 n.5 (questioning whether smoking in fact 
imposes net external costs and noting that, in any event, “measuring [such costs], comparing 
them with the social costs of merger-induced supracompetitive pricing, and evaluating the 
social costs and benefits of the products that consumers deflected from cigarettes by that 
pricing would substitute would be an unfeasible undertaking for the court in an antitrust 
suit.”). 
 176. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898) 
(asserting that some common law courts had “set sail on a sea of doubt” when they assumed 
the power to ascertain whether horizontal cartels had set “reasonable” prices). 
 177. See BORK, supra note 2, at 113–14 (contending, persuasively, that antitrust courts 
should ignore second-best considerations). 
 178. Cf. Hicks, supra note 91, at 114. 
 179. See BORK, supra note 2, at 114 (“In order to take into account second-best’s caution 
in a price-fixing case, for example, the court would first have to measure the gap between 
price and marginal cost—in itself an all but impossible task.  Next, the court would have to 
inquire whether there existed divergences between marginal cost and price in any industry 
. . . to and from resources might move if the cartel were outlawed, and whether such 
divergences in any such industry would probably be increased or lessened by outlawing the 
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one presumes that the American economy is generally competitive, partly 
as a result of antitrust regulation, then it stands to reason that most such 
second-best arguments will fail “on the merits,” because the resources freed 
up by anticompetitive output reductions will usually flow to competitive 
markets or at least markets that are more competitive than those where the 
challenged conduct takes place and thus not eliminate any distortions.180  
As then-judge Breyer reminded us in a different context, antitrust is a costly 
administrative system that cannot implement every nuance of an 
economist’s model.181 
Still, the partial equilibrium paradigm embraces other simplifying 
assumptions, assumptions that may be less defensible.  For one thing, like 
the perfect competition model, the model ignores the existence and passage 
 
price agreement.  Finally, the court would have to judge whether the new equilibrium, across 
all affected industries, would be better or worse for consumers than the present equilibrium.  
The objection is not merely that every price-fixing case would take ten or fifteen years to try, 
but that the task itself is beyond the capacity of any court or of any other institution.”); 
Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1626 n.172 (“Economists attempting to determine the 
relevance of “second-best” outcomes in individual cases face a very difficult, time-
consuming, and expensive process.  Rarely do they have sufficient data to incorporate 
second-best factors into any particular antitrust analysis.  To require antitrust policy to 
consider “second-best” arguments would be burdensome and unworkable.  One must treat 
‘second best’ considerations as theoretical curiosities or abandon any hope of having a 
theoretical basis for antitrust policy.” (citations omitted)); see also FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 180. Cf. Claus Thustrup Hansen, Second Best Antitrust in General Equilibrium:  A 
Special Case, 63 ECON. LETTERS 193 (1999) (concluding that antimonopoly regulation will 
reduce welfare if a “large fraction” of the economy is monopolistic).  Indeed, the seminal 
study on the impact of market power on resource allocation concluded that the American 
economy is quite competitive, with market-power distortions reducing GDP by a mere 0.1 
percent. See Harberger, supra note 17.  Based on this finding, Harberger concluded that 
“[w]e can neglect monopoly elements and still gain a very good understanding of how our 
economic process works and how our resources are allocated.  When we are interested in the 
big picture of our manufacturing economy, we need not apologize for treating it as 
competitive, for in fact it is awfully close to being so.”  Harberger’s findings are particularly 
noteworthy, given that he studied the impact of monopoly during the 1920s, a period of 
relatively lax antitrust enforcement.  Subsequent studies have generally confirmed 
Harberger’s conclusions that the welfare losses from exercises of market power are quite 
small. See, e.g., Dean A. Worcester, New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly, United 
States:  1956–1969, 40 S. ECON. J. 234 (1978). 
 181. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(“Nonetheless, while technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those 
laws cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views.  For, unlike 
economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of 
rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers 
advising their clients.  Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and 
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, 
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.  Thus, despite the theoretical 
possibility of finding instances in which horizontal price fixing, or vertical price fixing, are 
economically justified, the courts have held them unlawful per se, concluding that the 
administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the occasional ‘economic’ loss.”); see also 
BORK, supra note 2, at 113 (“The theory does not address itself to the probability of the bad 
result, but states it merely as a possible outcome.”). 
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of time.182  That is, the transaction examined by the model takes place in an 
instant, with market power and efficiencies manifesting themselves 
immediately and simultaneously.183  Moreover, both market power and 
efficiencies are implicitly assumed to be permanent.184  These assumptions, 
of course, render it unnecessary to discount either impact when comparing 
harms with benefits.185 
Moreover, the model ignores the positive impact that efficiencies 
resulting from such transactions have upon the welfare of participants, 
including purchasers, in other markets.  After all, within the trade-off 
model, efficiencies manifest themselves as reduced costs per unit of 
producing the industry’s remaining output.186  These efficiencies enhance 
the welfare of producers and consumers, with the division between them 
depending upon the extent to which the transaction results in market power 
and thus above-cost pricing.187  If the merger results in higher prices, it is 
said, firms have not passed on such efficiencies to purchasers but have 
instead “pocketed” them.188  But of course these cost reductions, reflected 
in a new cost curve, are more than just pecuniary accounting constructs that 
influence firm profits.  Instead, these reductions reflect the fact that industry 
participants must now purchase and employ a smaller quantity of real 
resources to produce any given unit of output.  Thus, as other scholars have 
recognized, these cost reductions will also manifest themselves as resources 
freed up for other possible uses.189  Moreover, these resources will not sit 
 
 182. See FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
ECONOMICS 178–79 (1995) (describing perfect competition’s instantaneous market clearing); 
HAYEK, supra note 137, at 96 (explaining that satisfaction of perfect competition’s various 
assumptions results in instantaneous equilibrium); JOE BAIN, PRICE THEORY 14–15 (1952) 
(explaining that price theory focuses on ascertaining the “end result” of responses to a “fixed 
set of determinants” and does not generally incorporate questions regarding the passage of 
time and movement from one equilibrium to the next); see also KNIGHT, supra note 137, at 
77–82 (in perfect competition, economic adjustments occur immediately after the “brief 
interval” during which production occurs). 
 183. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23. 
 184. It should be noted that Williamson does consider the passage of time in one sense, 
namely, he considers the possibility that, but for the merger, a firm or firms would realize the 
same efficiencies via internal expansion and thus without merger-created market power. See 
id. at 25–26. 
 185. Cf. id. (discounting to derive the present value of future efficiencies obtained by 
means of future internal expansion, an alternative to immediate merger). 
 186. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text; see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, 
supra note 44, at 798. 
 187. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26. 
 188. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
 189. See BORK, supra note 2, at 108 (“Cost reductions [from a merger to monopoly that 
creates efficiencies] mean that the saved resources are freed up to produce elsewhere in the 
economy.”); SCHERER, supra note 57, at 26 (explaining that the cost reduction resulting from 
a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up productive resources and thus 
increases output in other markets); Blair & Sokol, supra note 37, at 490 (“Cost savings that 
result from merger-specific productive efficiencies that do more than increase the merging 
parties’ profits are important.  Since resources are freed up, consumers benefit from lower 
prices in other markets.”); Heyer, supra note 19, at 39–40 (explaining how a merger that 
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idle; after all, the industry had to bid them away from other industries, 
where firms were willing to pay a positive price for them.190  As a result, 
such resources will presumably flow to other markets.191  More technically, 
the newly created firm will demand fewer such inputs, thereby reducing 
overall demand for them and reducing the price that firms in other markets 
must pay for such inputs. As a result, firms in other markets will employ 
more such inputs, increasing their own output as a result and at least partly 
offsetting the reduction in output in the first market.192  Indeed, at least one 
scholar has stated definitively that, where economies of scale lead to a 
monopoly whose efficiencies outweigh the deadweight loss, such 
monopolization will increase society’s overall total output, despite the 
output reduction in the monopolized market.193 
 
reduces production costs frees up resources for use elsewhere in the economy); Alan J. 
Meese, Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession:  Why Less (Enforcement) Might 
Mean More (GDP), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1633, 1674–75 (2012) (“Whether or not the 
benefits of cost reductions are “passed on” to consumers in the relevant market, such 
efficiencies will free up productive resources that will flow to other sectors in the economy 
. . . .  Because this resource flow will not enhance market power in other markets, output in 
those markets will almost invariably increase.”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 86 
(“As a matter of sound economics, the [total] economic welfare approach is almost always 
preferable; most efficiencies have a way of trickling through the economy so that they 
benefit everyone.”); Williamson, supra note 19, at 112 (contending that efficient resource 
allocation is more important to long-run economic growth than effective macroeconomic 
stabilization).  Of course, monopolistic output reduction also frees up resources that can be 
employed to increase production in other markets, but such reductions “by definition” 
allocate resources to uses that produce less value than they would produce in the 
monopolized market, with no offsetting improvement in productive efficiencies. See 
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 18–19 (“[F]ailure to maximize the value of the output 
bundle and failure to maximize the sum of consumers’ plus producers’ surpluses are 
conceptually identical manifestations of monopolistic resource misallocation.”).  The only 
exception, of course, is when conditions are such that the theory of second-best applies. See 
supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 190. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 105 (1966) (“The cost of any 
productive service to user A is the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere.  The 
foregone alternative is the cost.”); KNIGHT, supra note 137, at 92. 
 191. See Heyer, supra note 19, at 39–40; see also Meese, supra note 189, at 1675. 
 192. See generally LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 115–29. Cf. SCHERER & ROSS, supra 
note 57, at 26 (explaining how a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up 
resources and increases output in other markets); id. at 23 & n.27 (explaining that such cost 
reductions free up resources and thereby result in output increases in other sectors of the 
economy). 
 193. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 26 (stating that “failure to maximize the 
value of the output bundle and failure to maximize the sum of consumers’ plus producers’ 
surplus are conceptually identical manifestations of monopolistic resource misallocation.”); 
id. at 22 (“Excess costs [due to productive inefficiency] reduce combined consumers’ plus 
producers’ surplus just as monopolistic resource misallocation does, and a relatively small 
unit cost elevation [resulting from the prohibition of monopoly that would otherwise result in 
productive efficiencies] might deplete the surplus even more than a monopolistic price 
elevation of appreciable proportions.”); id. at 28 (quoting Adam Smith for the proposition 
that an individual producer labors in a competitive economy to make the whole produce as 
great as possible); see also Williamson, supra note 19, at 21 (stating that the partial 
equilibrium trade-off model can be employed to examine “the effects on resource 
allocation”); id. at 22 n.4 (noting that the use of “dead-weight loss” to refer to monopolistic 
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Moreover, output increases in other markets will presumably reduce 
prices in such markets, thereby increasing the welfare of consumers in such 
markets.194  Thus, an efficiency-generating transaction that increases prices 
in one market will nonetheless increase output and reduce prices in other 
markets.  In these circumstances, application of a “purchaser welfare” 
standard based on the partial equilibrium model and resulting condemnation 
of a transaction that increases prices in one market will certainly reduce the 
(potential) welfare of consumers in some other markets and may actually 
reduce the overall welfare of purchasers throughout the economy.195 
V.  REFRAMING THE PURCHASER WELFARE V. TOTAL WELFARE DEBATE 
As explained above, the partial equilibrium trade-off model provides an 
incomplete account of the impact of transactions or practices that both 
increase prices and also generate efficiencies.  In particular, the model, by 
hypothesis, excludes consideration of the impact of such efficiencies on 
other markets.  The model also excludes the possibility that the impact of 
the transaction or practice might change over time.  For instance, the model 
excludes the possibility that a new entry might eventually dissipate any 
market power, thereby ensuring that purchasers in the relevant market 
realize the benefits of the transaction’s or practice’s efficiencies.  This part 
offers suggestions for how to reframe antitrust analysis to account for the 
recognitions that (1) efficiencies generated in one market will impact other 
markets and (2) the balance of a transaction’s or practice’s benefits and 
harms in the relevant market might change over time. 
A.  Spatial Reframing 
So far as the author is aware, no other scholar has examined the relevance 
of such resource flows for the debate over the proper definition of 
“consumer welfare.”196  Instead, contending camps repeatedly disagree 
about whether tribunals should include the welfare of producers when 
examining the welfare consequences of transactions that produce both 
 
misallocation is too restrictive because productive inefficiency is also a deadweight loss).  In 
short, Scherer agrees with Williamson that the realization of productive efficiencies will 
enhance allocative efficiency and also assumes that a practice that increases total surplus in 
one market will increase the nation’s overall economic welfare, that is, the “value of the 
output bundle.” 
 194. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 37, at 484–85; Meese, supra note 189, at 1673–76. 
 195. See Meese, supra note 189, at 1673–76. 
 196. But see id. at 1675 (“[I]n some cases, conduct that violates a consumer welfare 
effects standard might actually reduce the aggregate price level, by freeing up so many 
resources that output increases in other markets collectively lower prices that exceed the 
price increase in the monopolized market.”); id. at 1675 n.261 (“In such cases, application of 
the consumer welfare effects standard would actually reduce consumer welfare as a whole, 
even if one excluded producers from the definition of ‘consumer’ and included only those 
individuals who purchase products from producers.  Put another way, application of a total 
welfare standard may in fact improve the welfare of such narrowly defined consumers more 
than application of a standard that purportedly seeks to maximize only their welfare.”). 
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market power and efficiencies.197  This narrow framing of the normative 
question, of course, is a testament to the hold that the partial equilibrium 
paradigm exerts over the mind of antitrust scholars, practitioners, and 
regulatory economists who seek to tackle antitrust problems.198 
However, the fact that such market-centric framing is understandable 
does not thereby justify ignoring the positive impact of a transaction on 
consumers in other markets.  After all, the ordinary rationales for ignoring 
other extramarket welfare consequences may simply not apply when such 
consequences take the form of efficiency-driven resource flows to other 
markets.  For instance, as mentioned earlier, antitrust generally ignores the 
possibility that the naked exercise of market power and output reduction in 
one market can actually increase overall welfare by redeploying resources, 
increasing output, and reducing distortions in other, previously 
monopolized markets.199  By contrast, recognition of the impact of 
efficiency-induced resource flows is more straightforward and less 
costly.200  For one thing, the extramarket impact of such resource flows is 
unambiguously positive, and the impact generally does not depend upon the 
competitive conditions in other markets.201 By contrast, and as explained 
previously, the chance that naked output reductions in one market will 
actually increase overall welfare is only that, a chance, and not a very large 
chance in an economy that is generally competitive, in part because of 
 
 197. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
 198. See Meese, supra note 110, at 519–21 (describing the hold that the partial 
equilibrium paradigm has on antitrust scholars, judges, and practitioners). 
 199. See supra notes 165–66, 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 200. Note here that “recognition” of such efficiencies for the purpose of antitrust analysis 
does not necessarily mean case-by-case consideration of such efficiencies. 
 201. That is, whether or not other markets are monopolized, resource flows to such 
markets will result in output increases, without any corresponding output decreases in the 
market where efficiencies are realized in the first place.  Thus, the impact of such flows will 
generally be positive.  The only exception will be in those instances in which output 
increases in other markets produce negative externalities that are inefficient.  In such cases, 
the movement of resources from the original market to other markets could reduce output.  
There are, however, three separate reasons that this possibility should not undermine the 
recognition of such extramarket efficiency effects.  First, other legal regimes should 
minimize the extent of such inefficient negative externalities.  Second, even if a legal regime 
does not currently address such externalities in a particular industry, an increase in the 
magnitude of such externalities might induce political action creating such a regime (though, 
of course, the cost of the resulting regulatory regime would itself qualify as an externality, 
though presumably one less costly than the underlying externality that the regime combats).  
Third, it seems at least equally likely that production in some industries will be characterized 
by positive externalities, the presence of which will actually magnify the benefits of resource 
flows from the original market to others.  Thus, failure to recognize such resource flows 
could “throw the baby out with the bath water,” by depriving society of the benefits of 
output increases, including those in markets characterized by positive externalities, so as to 
eliminate the occasional instance in which such increases take place in markets with 
uncorrected inefficient externalities. 
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robust antitrust regulation.202  Moreover, market-power induced output 
reductions generally occur only “at the margins,” thus freeing up only 
modest resources for use elsewhere.  By contrast, productive efficiencies 
are, by their nature, inframarginal, that is, apply to every unit of output that 
a firm or firms continue to produce after the transaction that results in the 
efficiencies.203  Thus, the realization of such efficiencies will have a larger 
(necessarily positive) impact than the (ambiguous) impact of 
anticompetitive output reductions.204 
As a result, the benefits of recognizing the impact of efficiency-generated 
resource flows will be significantly greater than the benefits of recognizing 
traditional second best possibilities, for instance.  But what about the costs?  
As an initial matter, the calculation of the magnitude of such efficiencies 
will not entail any costs over and above those that tribunals must otherwise 
incur if they have already recognized an efficiency defense as does, say, 
merger law and section 1’s Rule of Reason.205  Moreover, recognition of 
such efficiencies would have no impact on the costs (or benefits) of 
administering the per se rule against price fixing, which, of course, assumes 
the absence of efficiencies.206  Finally, and as explained in greater detail 
below, the magnitude of cost reductions itself serves as a proxy for the 
value that resources will produce in other markets.207  In short, the cost of 
recognizing such extramarket impacts are relatively low, while the benefits 
of doing so are relatively high. 
Recognition that transaction-specific productive efficiencies free up new 
resources for use in other markets requires a reframing of the debate 
between the “purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” schools of thought.  
For one thing, this realization undermines the supposed conflict between 
“producers” who realize efficiencies on the one hand, and “consumers” who 
purchase from these producers, on the other.208  This debate, as explained 
earlier, rests upon an assumption common to both camps, namely, that the 
owners of firms who exercise monopoly power resulting in increased prices 
 
 202. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining that, if most of the 
economy’s markets are competitive, anticompetitive output reduction in one market will 
likely reduce overall welfare). 
 203. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798 (“The larger the quantity [still] 
sold in the marketplace, the more important the efficiency gains, and the larger the area of 
the rectangle compared to the triangle.”); Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23.  Indeed, to 
the extent that the realization of efficiencies mitigates the extent of monopolistic output 
reduction, the magnitude of realized efficiencies will be that much larger, thereby further 
bolstering this distinction. 
 204. I am grateful to Sarah Stafford for this insight. 
 205. See supra notes 79–83, 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text (explaining how incorporation of 
second-best considerations into antitrust enforcement would increase the costs and reduce 
the benefits of the per se rule); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 
(1958) (conduct must always or almost always lack redeeming virtues to be unlawful per se). 
 207. See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (collecting various sources defining 
the debate in these terms). 
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necessarily “pocket” efficiencies that are not passed on to consumers, 
pocketing that is irrelevant for the total welfare school but dispositive for 
the purchaser welfare school.209  Instead, this insight establishes that, in 
addition to increasing producer surplus, efficiencies realized in one market 
will also improve the welfare of some consumers in one or more other 
markets.210  Thus, any claim that producers simply “pocket” the fruits of 
efficiencies, to the detriment of all consumers, is an economic fiction, 
perpetuated (intentionally) by the partial equilibrium model, a fiction that 
ignores the full allocational consequences of such transactions.211  
Therefore, while banning a transaction that increases prices but also creates 
efficiencies will protect purchasers in one market, such intervention will 
necessarily and simultaneously injure purchasers in other markets.  Thus, 
while purporting to champion the interests of purchasers, proponents of the 
purchaser welfare approach are instead elevating the welfare of some 
purchasers over others.212  At the same time, proponents of a total welfare 
standard have perhaps needlessly characterized producers as consumers and 
thereby declared producer surplus to be part of the consumer welfare 
calculus, adding confusion to the debate. 
To be sure, the extramarket impact of any given transaction might appear 
to be relatively small, perhaps indiscernible, because resources freed up by 
the realization of productive efficiencies might in some cases be dispersed 
 
 209. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
 210. See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the realization of 
productive efficiencies improves the allocation of resources as much as elimination of 
monopoly).  Of course, the complete specification of this claim requires the identification of 
the relevant “consumers” or “purchasers” in other markets.  It would be tempting to equate 
these purchasers with the “ultimate consumers” in other markets.  However, the purchaser 
welfare standard does not purport to define “purchaser” or “consumer” so narrowly.  
Moreover, innumerable Sherman Act decisions treat business firms as “purchasers” or 
“consumers,” entitled to obtain treble damages resulting from cartel pricing or unlawful 
monopolization. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 
488–94 (1968) (holding that a firm could obtain treble damages based upon the magnitude of 
the monopoly overcharge resulting from unlawful exclusionary practices); see also Ill. Brick 
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that masonry firms were the only proper 
plaintiffs for challenging a cartel of brick manufacturers).  As a result, this Article assumes 
that firms in other markets that purchase inputs freed up by the realization of efficiencies are 
“purchasers” for purposes of applying the purchaser welfare standard.  If, on the other hand, 
only ultimate consumers count as “purchasers,” calculation of the impact of a transaction 
upon “purchasers” in other markets would require calculation of the extent to which firms in 
those other markets “pass through” cost savings to ultimate purchasers.  I am grateful to 
Sarah Stafford for calling my attention to the pass-through question. 
 211. Cf. supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (explaining the claim by proponents 
of the purchaser welfare approach that producers simply “pocket” the proceeds of 
efficiencies, at the expense of marketplace consumers). 
 212. As explained earlier, this is also true when, say, a purchaser welfare standard results 
in the condemnation of an efficiency-creating merger that results in lower prices for most 
purchasers because the defendants, via price discrimination, are able to raise prices to a small 
subset of consumers in an otherwise larger relevant market. See supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
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across several markets.213  Though, here again, it is useful to recall that 
such efficiencies will be inframarginal in nature and thus be larger perhaps 
than initially supposed.214  Moreover, while the resource effects of any 
given transaction may be relatively small in this sense, antitrust rules must 
be designed with a large class of transactions, practices, and agreements in 
mind.  By analogy, the Sherman Act would not tolerate price fixing 
agreements between small firms because no single agreement would have a 
large impact on resource allocation.  Instead, the Sherman Act bans the 
entire class of such agreements.  Taken together, the various efficient 
transactions, practices, and contracts that individually offend a purchaser 
welfare standard may, over time, improve the overall welfare of all 
purchasers in the economy, viewed as a class, including those in the 
markets where such transactions take place.  Indeed, some purchasers in the 
market where a challenged practice takes place may also be purchasers in 
markets to which resources flow and increase output; purchases in the 
original market may constitute only a fraction of total purchases.  Because 
each consumer participates in several markets at once, application of a total 
welfare standard that validates transactions that, on balance, enhance the 
allocation of resources could actually increase the welfare of all purchasers 
over time.215  If so, then a standard that validates all efficient transactions 
will satisfy the pareto-like quality of the purchaser welfare standard.216 
 
 213. See generally J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 
709–10 (explaining that, under conditions of perfect competition, the elimination of a firm in 
one market will free up resources that “will have to be scattered about at the margins” of 
other uses). But see Harberger, supra note 161, at 791 (contending that, in some cases, 
extramarket effects will be concentrated in a few markets). 
 214. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
 215. Cf. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 1703 (“In the long run 
consumers gain the most from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive 
efficiency.”).  Indeed, assuming a fixed rate of economic growth, a total welfare approach 
could also increase aggregate purchaser welfare in the long run, as it will result in larger 
GDP and thus a larger base on which such a fixed rate would be applied (and compounded).  
Of course, some have made similar claims in support of an efficiency norm for tort law. See 
generally Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–91 (1873) (contending that a negligence 
standard for tort law, while depriving some victims of the chance to recover damages for 
certain injuries, will nonetheless improve such individuals’ welfare, by encouraging 
economic activity); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW (1987) (contending that parties who “lose” from a particular efficient rule of 
tort law may nonetheless support an overall efficiency norm because such a norm would, on 
balance, improve their welfare).  Proponents of zoning regulations have made similar claims, 
namely, that such interference with the manner in which one uses his property will enhance 
the welfare of those whose property is regulated by creating a mutual reciprocity of 
advantage. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926).  In the 
same way, allowing purchasers to challenge efficient transactions simply because they 
increase prices in a particular market may in fact reduce the welfare of such market 
participants. 
 216. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 83–84 (explaining distinction between Pareto 
superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria and that the total welfare standard rests on 
the latter). 
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How is it, then, that the antitrust law might reframe current doctrine so as 
to recognize the impact of efficiencies on other markets?  First, it seems 
appropriate to reiterate that, despite the tendency of antitrust experts to 
distinguish between them, productive efficiency and deadweight loss are 
two sides of the same coin.217  That is, realization of productive efficiencies 
can “improve” the allocation of resources and thus individual “want 
satisfaction” just as much and in the same way as a monopolistic 
misallocation of resources can reduce such satisfaction.218  Thus, a 
technological innovation that reduces the cost of producing a particular 
good improves the allocation of resources just as much as the elimination of 
a naked cartel or nonefficient monopoly.219  As F.M. Scherer observed 
more than three decades ago, a monopoly that rests upon significant 
economies of scale will—if it produces efficiencies that exceed deadweight 
losses—result in a net increase in the value of total output produced by the 
economy, as the value of output increases in other markets exceeds the 
value destroyed by the deadweight loss in the monopolized market.220 
Once we recognize that efficient conduct affects numerous markets at 
once and improves the economy’s net allocation of resources, we can no 
longer rely exclusively upon a partial equilibrium model to conduct the 
antitrust inquiry.  Instead, we can employ the typical aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply model from macroeconomic theory—a general 
equilibrium model—to give content to F.M. Scherer’s observation.221  If 
Scherer is correct, and there is no reason to believe he is not, then we can 
 
 217. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text; cf. BORK, supra note 2, at 104–06 
(distinguishing between productive and allocative efficiency). 
 218. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 219. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 519, 523–24 (1998) 
(explaining how technological advances can enhance productivity and thus increase a 
nation's total output). 
 220. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.  This conclusion, it should be noted, is 
consistent with the observation that a firm’s costs equal the value of the output these 
resources would have produced in other markets. STIGLER, supra note 190, at 105 (“The cost 
of any productive service to user A is the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere.  The 
foregone alternative is the cost.”).  Thus, the magnitude of cost reduction serves as a proxy 
for the value of output increases in other markets. 
 221. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 74 (7th ed. 2010) (explaining that the 
basic model of the macroeconomy is general equilibrium in nature, because it incorporates 
various interactions that determine the overall supply and demand for goods and services); 
see also Williamson, supra note 161, at 702 n.10 (“When changes in the relevant market do 
affect the general economy, a general equilibrium analysis, in which prices and quantities for 
all markets must be determined together, is usually appropriate.”).  In other contexts, 
scholars have employed general equilibrium models to determine the macroeconomic impact 
of industry-by-industry state-imposed cartelization. See, e.g., Harold L. Cole & Lee E. 
Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression:  A General 
Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 784 (2004) (studying the impact of the 
National Industrial Recovery Act, which imposed industrial and labor cartels, and the 
National Labor Relations Act, which imposed labor cartels, upon GDP); Christina D. Romer, 
Why Did Prices Rise in the 1930s?, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 167, 187–93 (1999) (testing the impact 
of the National Industrial Recovery Act upon economy-wide wages and prices during the 
Great Depression). 
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model the net impact of such monopolization (or a merger that results in 
such monopolization), as a shift in the long run aggregate supply curve.222  
This “curve” is in fact vertical, and it represents the value of the output that 
the economy can produce when all of its resources are fully employed.223  
The realization of technological or other efficiencies by merger or otherwise 
will allow a firm or firms to employ a less resource-intensive production 
process.224  By hypothesis, the resulting improvement in resource allocation 
will more than outweigh the deadweight loss and resulting misallocation 
due to market power.225  As a result, the economy will be capable of 
producing more output—with the very same resources—than it was able to 
produce before the transaction, with the result that the aggregate supply 
curve will shift to right.226  Such a shift is analogous to the macroeconomic 
impact of research and development and resulting innovation, encouraged 
by the prospect of obtaining a patent, for instance.227  Like a merger to 
monopoly, such patents also result in above-cost pricing and a resulting 
allocative loss.228  Society nonetheless tolerates such harms because it 
believes that the resulting improvement in potential output and economic 
 
 222. See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, STANLEY FISCHER & RICHARD STARTZ, 
MACROECONOMICS 101 (11th ed. 2011) (“The aggregate supply curve describes, for each 
given price level, the quantity of output firms are willing to supply.”). 
 223. See id. (“The classical [vertical] supply curve is based on the assumption that the 
labor market is in equilibrium with full employment of the labor force.”); MANKIW, supra 
note 125, at 272–73 (describing the long-run aggregate supply curve as a vertical 
representation of the value of output that society could produce with fully employed 
resources). 
 224. See WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS 263 (5th 
ed. 2011) (explaining that technological innovation will increase potential output). 
 225. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (explaining how a transaction that 
results in relatively minor cost savings can increase overall welfare despite resulting market 
power and price increases).  Of course, if the impact of misallocation resulting from market 
power and higher prices exceeds the magnitude of productive efficiencies, then both the 
“total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” standards will condemn such a transaction.  This 
Article focuses on those instances in which efficiencies are sufficiently large that the two 
standards will produce different results. 
 226. See generally MANKIW, supra note 219, at 519 (explaining how an improvement in 
the utilization of resources can enhance an economy’s overall productivity); id. at 692 
(explaining how a technological improvement can increase an economy’s overall 
productivity); see also ARNOLD C. HARBERGER, USAID, ON THE PROCESS OF GROWTH AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2005) (“It is absolutely crucial to recognize 
that all economic growth takes place at the level of the productive enterprise.”); id. at 4 
(explaining that so-called “real cost reduction” is the most important driver of economic 
growth and results in such growth even when other components are stagnant). 
 227. See BOYES & MELVIN, supra note 224, at 263 (“Technological innovations allow 
businesses to increase the productivity of their existing resources.  As new technology is 
adopted the amount of output that can be produced by each unit of input increases, moving 
the aggregate supply curve to the right.”); MANKIW, supra note 125, at 535 (explaining how 
the patent system encourages innovation that results in the growth of potential national 
output); id. at 692–93 (explaining how technological improvement will result in a shift in the 
long-run aggregate supply curve). 
 228. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 689. 
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growth exceeds the offsetting welfare losses.229  Indeed Professors Areeda 
and Turner expressly analogized the use of “superior skill, foresight and 
industry” to obtain and protect a monopoly—what they called “competition 
on the merits”—to the protection of a monopoly via a valid patent, opining 
that antitrust law should not seek to prevent monopoly pricing that resulted 
from such efficiencies.230  A merger or other transaction or practice that 
creates efficiencies that exceed deadweight allocative losses is a classic 
example of such “competition on the merits” and will presumably increase 
potential output.231 
Of course, other things being equal, such a shift in the long-run aggregate 
supply curve will reduce the nation’s aggregate price level, which is set by 
the interaction of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves.232  
Moreover, such a reduction will reflect higher aggregate output and, as a 
result, greater aggregate consumer surplus.233  It would therefore seem that 
a merger or other transaction that results in efficiencies that exceed the 
allocative losses resulting from market power will necessarily increase the 
aggregate welfare of the economy’s purchasers. 
There are, however, two caveats to this analysis.  First, it may be that 
everything else is not equal.  For instance, nothing about the account just 
provided excludes the fact that the challenged practice or transaction will 
 
 229. See MANKIW, supra note 125, at 535; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 688–91 
(“[A] patent causes a pricing distortion—a monopoly price—after a discovery.  The 
government is faced with a trade-off:  the longer the patent, the greater the inducement for 
research but the larger the cost due to more research projects and the monopoly loss.”); 
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 450–54; see also Shuintin Yao & Lydia Gan, Monopoly 
Innovation and Welfare Effects, 4 ECON. E-JOURNAL (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2010-27. 
 230. “[A] monopolist whose power was legitimately acquired by patents cannot be denied 
monopoly profits without subverting the purpose of the patent laws.  Similarly, denying 
monopoly profits to those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and 
industry could eliminate the primary incentive to develop such competitive skill.  Finally, 
price restrictions would have perverse effects on the efficiency and innovation aspects of a 
monopolist’s on-going performance by eliminating the reward.” See Areeda & Turner, supra 
note 72, at 707; id. at 706–07 (equating “competition on the merits” with realization of 
efficiencies and pricing at or above cost). 
 231. See BOYES & MELVIN, supra note 227, at 263 (explaining that technological 
innovation will increase potential output).  As explained earlier, courts have considered the 
realization of efficiencies via economies of scale, for instance, as quintessential “competition 
on the merits,” lawful per se under section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if such conduct 
creates or protects a monopoly. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court recently agreed with Professors Areeda and Turner, opining that the 
prospect of obtaining and enjoying a monopoly provides incentives for innovation. See 
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly 
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.  The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth.”). 
 232. See MANKIW, supra note 221, at 272–73 & figs.9–7. 
 233. Id. 
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increase prices for those purchasers in the relevant market where the 
transaction or practice takes place.234  Moreover, such a price increase will 
itself dampen aggregate demand by reducing the value of the real balances 
that such consumers hold, raising interest rates, and reducing consumption 
and investment.235  Such a concern is illusory, however, for two reasons.  
First, when purchasers in the relevant market pay higher prices, producers 
reap the benefits, increasing the value of their own real balances and 
thereby any price effect on aggregate demand.  Indeed, to the extent that 
producers “pocket” any efficiencies, their real balances will rise more than 
any reduction in purchasers’ real balances, thus implying an increase in 
overall aggregate demand.236  Second, when prices fall in other markets, 
purchasers in such markets will also experience higher real balances, 
increasing their demand for goods.  These two effects account for the 
downward movement along the given aggregate demand curve and 
resulting increase in output due to the shift in aggregate supply. 
But this brings us to a second possible caveat.  That is, the analysis thus 
far, by focusing on aggregates, includes the consumer surplus that 
producers in the relevant market derive from additional expenditures upon 
newly produced goods.  These expenditures, of course, come at the expense 
of purchasers in the relevant market, who have paid higher prices and thus 
been the victims of income transfers to producers.237  As a result, one might 
argue, we cannot be certain that the resulting increase in aggregate 
consumer surplus will always reflect a true net increase in the welfare of 
those who are purchasers simpliciter, without accidentally including the 
enhanced (purchaser) welfare of producers who reap the fruits of monopoly 
power. 
If this second caveat is valid, then we cannot simply assume that any net 
efficient transaction will result in a net improvement in purchaser surplus, 
 
 234. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text (describing the disagreement between 
the “total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” schools about the proper treatment of conduct 
that both raises prices and generates efficiencies). 
 235. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 222, at 244–45; see also DON PATINKIN, MONEY, 
INTEREST, AND PRICES:  AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY AND VALUE THEORY 17–21 (2d abr. 
ed. 1989) (describing the separate so-called “real balance effect,” whereby an increase in real 
balances increases aggregate wealth and thus stimulates consumption for that reason alone). 
 236. Cf. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 23 n.7 (“For the low cost monopolist, that 
rectangle [reflecting efficiencies] is profit rather than cost.  Oversimplifying somewhat, the 
monopolist’s profit provides the purchasing power with which this additional output 
(presumably from other sectors of the economy) can be purchased for the monopolist’s 
stockholder’s consumption.”).  There is another way to characterize these phenomena within 
the confines of this model.  Succinctly, a transaction that creates efficiencies that exceed any 
allocative losses will shift the aggregate supply curve to the right, without impacting the 
location of the aggregate demand curve.  Instead, the net increase in real balances and 
resulting increased demand will manifest itself as a movement along the aggregate demand 
curve, downward and to the right. 
 237. See id. (“For the low cost monopolist, . . . .  the monopolist’s profit provides the 
purchasing power with which this additional output (presumably from other sectors of the 
economy) can be purchased for the monopolist’s stockholder’s consumption.”). 
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properly defined, even though the result will be an increase in GDP.  
Instead, we might have to settle for a case-by-case determination of the 
impact of a challenged practice or transaction on the overall welfare of 
purchasers, including those in other markets.238  Such an analysis would 
entail an examination of the relative magnitude of reductions in purchaser 
surplus in the original market, on the one hand, and cost reductions, on the 
other.239  These cost reductions, in turn, would serve as proxies for cost 
reductions in other markets and thus increase consumer surplus in such 
markets.240  In some cases, that surplus will exceed the reduction in 
purchaser surplus in the original market.  In other cases, it will not.  In any 
event, a faithful implementation of a true purchaser welfare standard would 
require the enforcement agencies and courts to determine and compare the 
relative magnitude of these two impacts on purchaser welfare.  Failure to do 
so would bias antitrust law and policy in favor of purchasers in the relevant 
market and against those in other markets, while at the same time, 
dampening GDP and stultifying economic growth for the reasons outlined 
above.241 
To be sure, such a case-by-case analysis will be somewhat more costly 
than simply determining whether a challenged practice, restraint, or 
transaction reduces purchaser welfare in the original market.  However, the 
prospect of such additional costs does not necessarily undermine the 
argument for such an approach.  After all, resulting improvements in 
purchaser welfare may well exceed the additional costs of making such 
determinations.  Moreover, such an approach will validate some efficient 
transactions that a partial equilibrium purchaser welfare standard would 
otherwise condemn, thereby freeing up resources that would more than 
offset the additional resources expended to make this determination.242  
Thus, such a system would in a sense both “pay for itself” and, in addition, 
increase the welfare of purchasers. 
 
 238. Cf. Harberger, supra note 161, at 789–91 (contending that economists should be 
willing to examine the impact of a proposed policy on more than one market). 
 239. Thus, one could imagine a transaction that creates significant efficiencies that greatly 
exceed any reduction in purchaser surplus in the relevant market.  In such cases, it seems 
possible that resource flows to other markets will result in a net increase in aggregate 
purchaser surplus.  Indeed, one scholar, otherwise supportive of a purchaser welfare 
standard, would not apply such a standard if “the aggregate efficiency costs of doing so 
would be large.” See Baker, supra note 8, at 522. 
 240. See STIGLER, supra note 190, at 105 (“The cost of any productive service to user A is 
the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere.  The foregone alternative is the cost.”); 
See also KNIGHT, supra note 137, at 92–93; Fink, supra note 161, at 15 (explaining that cost 
curves in original partial equilibrium market reflect the “value of using resources in other 
industries”). 
 241. Of course, such an analysis would require a determination of the relevant purchaser 
for the purpose of implementing the purchaser welfare standard. See supra note 210 and 
accompanying text. 
 242. While additional administrative costs would be a one-time expenditure, efficiencies 
would be permanent, thereby justifying the presumption that such efficiencies would exceed 
these administrative costs. 
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There is, of course, another approach that could improve the welfare of 
purchasers even more, at least in the longer run.  That is, the enforcement 
agencies and tribunals could simply validate all practices, restraints, and 
transactions that increase overall welfare (and thus GDP), without regard to 
whether the transaction results in a net improvement in purchaser welfare, 
recognizing that such transactions will necessarily increase the welfare of 
some purchasers, albeit not purchasers in the relevant market and, perhaps, 
not purchasers overall.  In addition to generating additional wealth, such an 
approach could also improve overall purchaser welfare in the long run, even 
if some transactions allowed by this standard reduce it in particular cases.  
Put another way, the population of efficient transactions that offend the 
current purchaser welfare standard may, when viewed as a whole, increase 
total purchaser welfare, even if some individual transactions do not.  If so, 
then validating all restraints, practices, or transactions that increase total 
welfare would also increase overall purchaser welfare.  In this way, society 
could “have its cake and eat it too,” that is, increase its total welfare and 
potential output while at the same time increasing the overall welfare of 
purchasers, albeit not as much as a more finely honed, case-by-case inquiry 
into the impact of a challenged transaction, practice or restraint on 
purchaser welfare.243 
B.  Temporal (Re)Framing 
As noted earlier, the partial equilibrium model assumes that market 
power and efficiencies arise simultaneously and that both effects continue at 
the same magnitude in perpetuity.244  Once a monopolist, always a 
monopolist, the model assumes.  In so doing, the model tracks the perfect 
competition model, which also suspends the operation of time and assumes 
that economic adjustments take place in an instant.245 
The exclusion of time can produce misleading results, whether one 
adopts a “purchaser welfare” or total welfare approach to the statute.  In 
particular, this assumption will in some cases force courts to ban 
transactions that will plainly improve the discounted present wealth of 
purchasers in the relevant market by reducing prices for all the market’s 
purchasers over the medium and long runs.  Take, for example, a merger 
that results in high levels of concentration as well as efficiencies.  Assume 
further that, while substantial, the efficiencies are not large enough to 
counteract the impact (upon price) of market power.  Finally, assume that 
new entry will be “likely” and “sufficient” to combat any exercise of market 
power (that is, to drive prices back to pretransaction levels), but that such 
entry will not take place soon enough to be “timely” under governing 
enforcement policies and/or case law to counteract a prima facie case of 
 
 243. Thus, such a standard could both generate wealth overall and enjoy wide support 
among purchasers. 
 244. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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anticompetitive harm.246  Under case law and prior agency guidelines, any 
entry that took more than two years was insufficiently “timely,” with some 
exceptions, thereby resulting in condemnation of the transaction.247  More 
recent guidelines seem to contemplate an even smaller window.  In 
particular, these guidelines provide that the prospect of entry will only 
defeat a prima facie case if such entry will occur rapidly enough to prevent 
“significant” anticompetitive harm, which the guidelines equate with 
increased prices.248  It thus seems possible that entry, even if “likely” and 
“sufficient,” will not defeat a prima facie case even if it will take place 
within two years because, in the meantime, marketplace consumers may 
suffer higher prices, if only temporarily, for a nontrivial (“significant”) 
period of time.249 
Yet, even if entry is not “timely” within the meaning of governing 
guidelines or case law, it may still occur, thereby counteracting any market 
power after the relevant timeliness window closes.  Moreover, if such entry 
does occur, and if it is likely and sufficient to counteract any exercise of 
market power, then market prices will fall to the new, lower cost of 
production and thus to below premerger levels, thereby increasing the 
postentry welfare of purchasers compared to what their welfare would have 
been during the same period without the transaction.  Here again, then, 
banning a transaction because it will reduce the immediate, short-run 
welfare of purchasers could reduce the overall welfare of such purchasers in 
the longer run. 
 
 246. See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54–58 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(articulating the requirement that predicted entry be timely, likely, and sufficient to rebut a 
prima facie case); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086–88 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); 
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 9 (same); DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND 
FED. TRADE COMM’N JOINT MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.0 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 JOINT 
MERGER GUIDELINES] (superceded) (same).  It should be noted that whether entry is in fact 
likely may depend upon the source of the efficiencies in question.  For instance, if such 
efficiencies rest upon economies of scale that new entrants cannot replicate, then entry may 
not occur in the short or even medium run. See TIBOR SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND 
COMPETITION 332–33 (1951).  Even here, however, growth in the market may eventually 
make room for one or more additional entrants.  Or, technology might change in a way that 
eliminates the incumbent’s cost advantage. 
 247. See Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56 (articulating and applying this 
requirement); 1992 JOINT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 246, § 3.2 (superceded) (“The 
Agency generally will consider timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be 
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact.”).  The same 
guidelines provide that entry outside the two-year window could be considered timely if 
such entry “would deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern [i.e., immediate 
post-transaction price increases] within the two year period and subsequently.” Id. 
 248. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 9.1 (providing that 
entry will only be deemed “timely” if “the impact of entrants in the relevant market [will] be 
rapid enough that customers are not significantly harmed by the merger, despite any 
anticompetitive harm that occurs prior to the entry”). 
 249. The new Guidelines do not indicate whether they define “significant” in relative 
terms (i.e., as a percentage of total sales) or in gross terms (as in a “significant dollar 
amount”). 
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This insight applies beyond the merger context, to any context in which 
eventual entry could induce parties to pass on once-”pocketed” efficiencies 
to purchasers.250  Moreover, if valid, this insight could require the 
adjustment of standards governing entry and efficiencies so as to recognize 
the possible symbiosis between the two standards.  In particular, where 
proponents of a merger or other practice show that the challenged 
arrangement will raise prices but also result in efficiencies, courts and 
agencies should entertain arguments that entry more than two years after the 
transaction will, because of the efficiencies in question, result in prices that 
are lower than those that existed before the transaction.251 
To be sure, the analysis thus far assumes that the individuals who are 
purchasers at the time of the transaction will also be purchasers into the 
indefinite future, thereby allowing  future price reductions to counteract the 
impact of immediate (but admittedly temporary) posttransaction price 
increases, thus ensuring that the transaction does not harm a single 
purchaser.  This assumption is, of course, unrealistic.  In reality, the 
composition of the class of purchasers will change over time.  Indeed, 
short-run price increases will induce some purchasers to turn elsewhere, and 
eventual price reductions might not bring these purchasers back.  Moreover, 
some products—think refrigerators and dishwashers—are such that the 
market, at least at plausible prices, consists of different purchasers each 
year.  Finally, new purchasers might enter the market over time as, say, they 
become old enough to drive or to operate an iPhone.  As a result, the sort of 
temporal reframing suggested here would necessarily contemplate some 
permanent injury to purchasers, so as to increase aggregate purchaser 
welfare.  At the same time, banning efficient, price-raising practices would 
prefer present consumers to those who will be purchasers in the future and, 
in addition, reduce long-run overall purchaser welfare. 
 
 250. See generally Meese, supra note 189, at 1676 (discussing similar considerations in 
the section 2 context).  Of course, as explained earlier, such efficiencies likely already 
reduced prices in other markets. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text. 
 251. Assume, for instance, that premerger prices are $100 per unit.  Assume further that, 
after the merger, prices rise to $110 per unit for two years.  Finally, assume that the new 
entry occurs in the third year, forcing the newly merged firm to pass along efficiencies to 
purchasers, thereby reducing market prices to $95 per unit in perpetuity.  Given plausible 
discount rates, the present value of such expected price reductions would exceed the short-
term harm to purchasers in the relevant market from the exercise of market power. 
